Two recent pieces in the NY Times and in Foreign Affairs have highlighted the challenges that Hamas has been facing from religious extremists in Gaza over recent months. They both note the armed confrontation with Jund Ansar Allah as well as criticisms by some that Hamas has not fully implemented the shari’a. Although some of its more radical supporters have attempted to institute certain dress restrictions for women and girls or other elements of Islamic law, senior officials have routinely overturned the edict.

These two pieces highlight one of the greatest challenges for Hamas—and for any religious party—to translate religious rhetoric into actual policies. It may seem counterintuitive that Hamas would be unsupportive of implementing religious law, but this issue lies at the heart of the current dilemma for Hamas.

Since its formation, Hamas’ base has consisted of individuals who are more supportive of religious rule as well as those who take a more militant approach toward Israel. However, Hamas’ victory in the 2006 election was the result of being able to expand this base to win the support of more moderate Palestinians as well. Thus, while some have attributed Hamas’ refusal to implement the shari’a as an attempt to appear more moderate in the eyes of external actors, likely the reason has much more to do with domestic support for the party.

The basic problem for Hamas lies in the differences in support for the shari’a in theory compared to in practice. In opinion polls, calls for the implementation of the shari’a tend to be popular. The connotation of the word suggests the correct way or path, which few individuals would not support. This positive association is so strong that even some largely secular regimes claim that the shari’a is the basis for all laws.

Yet, when elements of the shari’a have been implemented, it has not been overly popular with ordinary citizens. For example, after Muslim Brotherhood candidates in Jordan performed well in the 1989 election, they sought to implement parts of the shari’a. One such change limited the circumstances in which males could interact with females in public space. One implication was that fathers could no longer watch their daughters play sports since unrelated females were also present. After strong public resistance, this law was soon overturned.

Given its campaign promises for implementing laws in accordance with the shari’a, Hamas faces a critical challenge in managing its supporters. If it continues to resist calls for its implementation, then likely many members of its traditional base will lose faith in the movement and found new groups or parties more committed to the full implementation of the shari’a. On the other hand, if Hamas does implement the shari’a, more moderate supporters will likely become less supportive given that they are more supportive of the shari’a in theory than in practice. Thus, its future success as a party lies largely in its ability to resolve this dilemma.

Link: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65417/barak-mendelsohn/hamas-and-its-discontents

Link: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/08/14/world/AP-ML-Palestinians-Gaza-Shootout.html

A recent poll by Stan Greenberg has revealed that support for Hamas is relatively low in both Gaza and the West Bank. Within Gaza, 42% of respondents indicated that they disapproved strongly while a further 16% said that they disapprove of Hamas. In the West Bank, attitudes towards Hamas were somewhat less extreme, with only 16% of respondents stating that they strongly disapprove of Hamas and 41% saying that they disapproved.

The general interpretation tends to be that Hamas has lost popularity due to its record in office. After all, campaigning is much different than governing. Hamas won support in the 2006 election largely due to Fatah’s corruption and its rejection of the peace process. However, the outcome of Hamas’ rule in Gaza have lessened the popularity of these positions. Most important, the devastation of the Israeli attack on Gaza demonstrated the drawbacks of Hamas’ approach towards the peace process. Continued war and destruction is not the desired outcome for most ordinary Palestinians. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that Hamas has been involved in corruption itself, especially in the aftermath of the conflict in Gaza. For example, Hamas forces seized UN food aid in order to oversee its preferential distribution to its supporters. Somewhat weakened on these two issues, it is unclear how well Hamas would fare in a future election.

This interpretation, however, is overly simplistic. Even while in opposition, according to a poll done by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, support for Hamas was considerably lower than Fatah in late 2005. In fact, support was at that time was very similar to what Greenberg’s poll revealed. Shortly before the 2006 election, stated support for Hamas stood at 27.7% while stated support for Fatah was 45.0%. In the recent poll, Greenberg found that support for Hamas was 28% while support for Fatah was 45%.While elections are not likely at least until after a unity government is formed, Hamas finds itself at a familiar disadvantage that it was able to overcome in the last election when it won 44.5% of the vote. This time, however, Hamas has its own record in power to defend which makes it uncertain if it could overcome a similar deficit once again. Nevertheless, given the similarity between the numbers, it would be a mistake to assume that Hamas is down for the count.

Link: http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1251804506032&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

Link: http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p18e1.html

A recent Haaretz article reports that Fatah’s political leadership has told US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that unity talks will be aimed primarily at forming a caretaker government to pave the way for fresh elections. Assuming that this government recognizes Israel, it appears that the US is generally supportive of this effort.

Yet, what would result from fresh elections? A recent public opinion poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey research indicates that Hamas only trails Fatah by 7% in the Palestinian Territories. However, polls tend to underestimate support for Hamas due to the fact that supporters of smaller Islamist groups such as Islamic Jihad are likely to vote for Hamas. This means that Hamas will receive another 5% or so of support in fresh elections. As such, the two parties appear to remain deadlocked with around 20% of the population being undecided.

While fresh elections could prove surprising, at present there is little reason to believe that the overall outcome would be vastly different from 2006. If the electoral system remains the same, Hamas is likely to hold on to its parliamentary majority and there is a real chance Hamas might win the presidency if Marwan Barghouti is not released from prison. Without significant movement on the peace process or another major development, fresh elections would likely to lead to a continuation of the current political stalemate. If US leaders are pinning their hope that this will result in a Fatah-dominated government that can work towards peace, then this seems like nothing more than wishful thinking.

Link: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1070450.html

Link: http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2009/p31epressrelease.html

In an article for Time Magazine, Tony Karon recently suggested that the US may have to open a formal dialogue with Hamas in the near future. He suggests that this move would be in line with the change in the British stance towards Hizbullah in Lebanon. In this case, the British have concluded that despite Hizbullah’s brutal history, the “facts on the ground” in Lebanon mean that Hizbullah will remain a prominent player in the Lebanese system, necessitating some form of communication with the party.

Undoubtedly, Hamas is a major player in the West Bank and Gaza. While direct talks may prove necessary despite the costs, there remains another potential option. Rather than talking directly to Hamas, it is possible to talk directly to ordinary Palestinians who support Hamas.

It should be remembered that while Hamas originally came to prominence through its military operations, its real power comes from the support it receives from a substantial percentage of the Palestinian population. By comparison, Islamic Jihad and other radical groups have carried out numerous violent operations as well, but only Hamas is viewed by all players as being relevant today because of its mass following.

Overall, Palestinians tend to support Hamas for two basic reasons: anger at Fateh’s corruption and the failure of the Oslo process. The US can decrease support for Hamas by seeking to address these two factors. If this is done and new elections are held, then the new facts on the ground may reveal that talking directly to Hamas is less of a necessity.

Link: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1883382,00.html