![On Borders and [dis]Orders: The Effects of the International Norm of "Border Fixity"](/phpthumb/phpthumb.php?w=300&h=300&bg=FFFFFF&src=/files/iStock_000001920015XSmall_edited.jpg)
PAST EVENT
On Borders and [dis]Orders: The Effects of the International Norm of "Border Fixity"
Brown Bag Lunch
Series: International Security Brown Bag Seminar
Open to the Public - Belfer Center Library, Littauer-369
October 11, 2007
12:15-2:00 p.m.
| Speaker: | Boaz Atzili, Research Fellow, International Security Program |
Related Project: International Security
Description:
In the last 50–60 years, conquests and annexations of one's neighbors' territories are no longer acceptable tools of policy, as they were in the more distant past. Contrary to what we might expect, however, in regions in which most states are socio-politically weak, this new norm of "border fixity" results not in more peace but in more conflicts. For such states (which are common in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, and Central America) border fixity results in perpetuation and exacerbation of state weakness. Weak states in a world of fixed borders, in turn, are a source of frequent international conflicts, which arise out of spillover of internal conflicts and insurgency, as well as of foreign interventions.
This seminar will explore the logic of the theoretical argument and the empirical research with an emphasis on the case of state weakness and international conflict in Lebanon.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.
Contact:
ISP Program Coordinator
International Security Program,
79 John F. Kennedy St., Mailbox 53,
Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard University
Kennedy School of Government
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Email: susan_lynch@hks.harvard.edu
Phone: 617-496-1981
Fax: 617-495-8963
Url: http://www.belfercenter.org/ISP/
Summer-Fall 2007
"The Virtues and Vices of Fixed Territorial Ownership"
The SAIS Review of International Affairs, issue 2, volume XXVII
By Boaz Atzili, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2008
Today, territorial ownership of states is essentially fixed, in marked contrast to earlier periods in history. This change has affected states in two very different ways. In regions in which most states are socio-politically strong, fixed territorial ownership is a blessing. It enhances peace, stability, and cooperation between states. In regions in which most states are socio-politically weak, however, fixed territorial ownership is largely a curse. It perpetuates and exacerbates states' weakness, and contributes to internal conflicts that often spill overacross international borders.
Winter 2006/07
"When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict"
International Security, issue 3, volume 31
By Boaz Atzili, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2008
Since the end of World War II, the international community has regarded territorial conquest and annexation as illegitimate. The resulting norm of fixed borders has reduced external threats to the territorial integrity of many states, but such threats once drove leaders to engage in constructive state building. This norm, therefore, actually does more harm than good in weak states by eliminating incentives to reduce their internal weaknesses. Weak states are now a major source of global violence, generating civil wars that often spill over into interstate conflicts. The war in the Congo is a leading example.
