Skip to content home | events calendar | site index | subscribe | contact us | Print print  

advanced search ›

John F. Kennedy School of Government - Harvard University

John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University
 

Belfer Center Home > Events Calendar > The Closest of Enemies: Alliance Formation in the Afghan Civil War

 
The Closest of Enemies: Alliance Formation in the Afghan Civil War

Northern alliance soldiers ride on a tank as they prepare to enter the town of Khanabad, northern Afghanistan
AP Photo

PAST EVENT

The Closest of Enemies: Alliance Formation in the Afghan Civil War

Brown Bag Lunch
Series: International Security Brown Bag Seminar
Open to the Public - Belfer Center Library, Littauer-369
December 6, 2007
12:15-2:00 p.m.

Speaker: Fotini Christia, Research Fellow, International Security Program

Related Project: International Security

Description:

Some of the most brutal and long-lasting civil wars of our times are associated with the rapid formation and disintegration of alliances among warring groups as well as fragmentation within them. The resulting multiplicity of actors has paralyzed outsiders, who have often been unable to even follow the unraveling of the conflict's complex trajectory. This presentation attempts to enhance our understanding of civil war processes by looking at how groups align and the variables that shape their choices. Drawing on primary data from the case of Afghanistan, it suggests that alliances are tactical, motivated by a concern with victory and the capture of spoils. Groups rapidly and seemingly incessantly change partners, and no identity principles— ethnic, ideological, or otherwise—generate stable cleavages. In principle, all groups want to be in a coalition large enough to attain victory, while small enough to ensure large per capita payoffs. But in practice, this outcome proves difficult to secure. Given the multitude of players, their objectives, and their instrumental calculus, all coalitions appear to be dominated: a larger share of the spoils can be gained by joining a different alliance. The result is a process of constant defection, alliance reconfiguration, and even group fractionalization. Stability is only attained when an external arbiter can enforce cooperation.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.


Contact:

ISP Program Coordinator
International Security Program, 79 John F. Kennedy St., Mailbox 53, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard University
Kennedy School of Government
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Email: susan_lynch@hks.harvard.edu
Phone: 617-496-1981
Fax: 617-495-8963
Url: http://www.belfercenter.org/ISP/

EMAIL UPDATES

Get the latest research on the most important international topics

Sign up to receive updates of the Belfer Center's work on international security, climate change, nuclear issues, the Middle East, or more. Select the topics of your choice.