A new 50,000 Rials banknote released by the Central Bank of Iran on Mar. 12, 2007. Iran issued a banknote emblazoned with a nuclear symbol, seen in center, in a move seen as an assertion of the national will in the face of international sanctions.
AP Photo
PAST EVENT
Dangerous Deterrents? Evaluating the Argument and Evidence that Nuclear Acquisition Emboldens Weak States
Brown Bag Lunch
Series: International Security Brown Bag Seminar
Open to the Public - Belfer Center Library, Littauer-369
October 9, 2008
12:15-2:00 p.m.
| Speaker: | T. Negeen Pegahi, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program |
Related Projects: Science, Technology, and Public Policy, International Security, Managing the Atom
Description:
Under what conditions does acquiring nuclear weapons embolden weak states to do things they otherwise would not have done against their stronger adversaries? How frequently can we expect these conditions to obtain? And how severe will the results be when they do? This seminar will lay out the emerging conventional wisdom that acquisition has emboldened and will embolden states such as Iran; replace this flawed argument with a logically complete and less pessimistic competitor; and evaluate both in light of evidence from the crucial case of Pakistan.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.
Contact:
ISP Program Coordinator
International Security Program,
79 John F. Kennedy St., Mailbox 53,
Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard University
Kennedy School of Government
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Email: susan_lynch@hks.harvard.edu
Phone: 617-496-1981
Fax: 617-495-8963
Url: http://www.belfercenter.org/ISP/
