Fall 2006
"Preventing the Misuse of Biology: Lessons from the Oversight of Smallpox Virus Research"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 31
A delicate balance exists between the benefits of biotechnology research and the downside of making it widely available. If the international community does not establish a better system of governance to oversee and protect the research process, determined terrorist groups could exploit this research to develop their own biological weapons. The successes and failures of the World Health Organization's supervision of all research done with the live smallpox virus provide valuable lessons for future cooperative international governance.
Summer 2002
"A Farewell to Germs: The U.S. Renunciation of Biological and Toxin Warfare, 1969-70"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 27
The discovery of mailed anthrax spores shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rattled an already-shaken nation. Since then, public awareness of the dangers of biological weapons has increased tremendously.
February, 2000
Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons
Book
Policymakers, scholars, and the news media have been alarmed by the potential for chemical and biological weapons (CBW) terrorism, and the U.S. Congress has allocated billions of dollars for counterterrorism and "consequence management" programs. Driving these concerns are the global spread of scientific knowledge and technology relevant to CBW terrorism and the vulnerability of civilian populations to chemical and biological attacks.
Notably lacking from the analysis, however, has been a careful assessment of the terrorists themselves. What types of terrorist groups or individuals are both capable of acquiring chemical and biological weapons and motivated to use them, and for what purposes? Further, what types of toxic agents would probably be produced, and how would they be delivered?
