Summer 2012
"The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 37
By S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
Pakistan has used religiously motivated militant forces as a central part of its grand strategy since its founding, relying on armed groups to compensate for its material and political weaknesses. Recently, however, many of these groups have grown in strength and are looking to pursue their own agendas instead of bending to Pakistan’s will. Pakistan is thus caught in a jihad paradox: the very characteristic of the Pakistani state that makes supporting Islamist militancy useful also makes it extremely dangerous to Pakistan’s internal stability. Pakistan must recognize that its current policy has outlived its utility and work to defeat the militant organizations operating in its territory.
Fall 2008
"Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 33
Nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment. First, nuclear weapons’ ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan’s dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. Second, these Indo-Pakistani crises led India to adopt a more aggressive conventional military posture toward Pakistan. This development could exacerbate regional security-dilemma dynamics and increase the likelihood of Indo-Pakistani conflict in years to come. Thus nuclear weapons not only destabilized South Asia in the first decade after the nuclear tests; they may damage the regional security environment well into the future.
Fall 2005
"India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 30
Unlike in Cold War Europe, in contemporary South Asia nuclear danger facilitates, rather than impedes, conventional conflict.



