July 2010
"Keeping Kim: How North Korea's Regime Stays in Power"
Policy Brief
By Daniel Byman, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security and Jennifer Lind
"In contrast to the media, which persist in portraying Kim Jong-il as a madman or an incompetent playboy, this analysis shows him to be a shrewd, if reprehensible, leader. His meticulous use of the authoritarian toolbox reveals him to be a skilled strategic player. Kim shows every sign of being rational—and thus deterrable."
Fall 2011
"The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 36, volume 2
By Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind
The upcoming transition in North Korea’s leadership will not inevitably bring about a collapse of government, but the potential consequences of such an event necessitate advance and combined planning. It is imperative that China, South Korea, and the United States develop a coordinated response, as each of these countries could take destabilizing action to protect their individual interests. A relatively benign collapse could require 260,000 to 400,000 troops to gain control of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, prevent humanitarian disaster, manage regional refugees, and ensure stable U.S.-Chinese relations. Civil war or war on the peninsula would only increase these requirements.
Fall 2011
"The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 36, volume 2
By Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind
The upcoming transition in North Korea’s leadership will not inevitably bring about a collapse of government, but the potential consequences of such an event necessitate advance and combined planning. It is imperative that China, South Korea, and the United States develop a coordinated response, as each of these countries could take destabilizing action to protect their individual interests. A relatively benign collapse could require 260,000 to 400,000 troops to gain control of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, prevent humanitarian disaster, manage regional refugees, and ensure stable U.S.-Chinese relations. Civil war or war on the peninsula would only increase these requirements.
Fall 2011
"The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 36, volume 2
By Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind
The upcoming transition in North Korea’s leadership will not inevitably bring about a collapse of government, but the potential consequences of such an event necessitate advance and combined planning. It is imperative that China, South Korea, and the United States develop a coordinated response, as each of these countries could take destabilizing action to protect their individual interests. A relatively benign collapse could require 260,000 to 400,000 troops to gain control of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, prevent humanitarian disaster, manage regional refugees, and ensure stable U.S.-Chinese relations. Civil war or war on the peninsula would only increase these requirements.
Fall 2011
"The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 36, volume 2
By Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind
The upcoming transition in North Korea’s leadership will not inevitably bring about a collapse of government, but the potential consequences of such an event necessitate advance and combined planning. It is imperative that China, South Korea, and the United States develop a coordinated response, as each of these countries could take destabilizing action to protect their individual interests. A relatively benign collapse could require 260,000 to 400,000 troops to gain control of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, prevent humanitarian disaster, manage regional refugees, and ensure stable U.S.-Chinese relations. Civil war or war on the peninsula would only increase these requirements.
July 2010
"Keeping Kim: How North Korea's Regime Stays in Power"
Policy Brief
By Daniel Byman, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security and Jennifer Lind
"In contrast to the media, which persist in portraying Kim Jong-il as a madman or an incompetent playboy, this analysis shows him to be a shrewd, if reprehensible, leader. His meticulous use of the authoritarian toolbox reveals him to be a skilled strategic player. Kim shows every sign of being rational—and thus deterrable."
Summer 2010
"Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 35
By Daniel Byman, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security and Jennifer Lind
Speculation about the future of the North Korean regime has been intense for nearly two decades, yet Kim Jong-il's hold on power appears more secure than many believe. Several theories of authoritarian control help to explain how Kim Jong-il and his family have remained in power and how this might change over time.
July 2010
"Keeping Kim: How North Korea's Regime Stays in Power"
Policy Brief
By Daniel Byman, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security and Jennifer Lind
"In contrast to the media, which persist in portraying Kim Jong-il as a madman or an incompetent playboy, this analysis shows him to be a shrewd, if reprehensible, leader. His meticulous use of the authoritarian toolbox reveals him to be a skilled strategic player. Kim shows every sign of being rational—and thus deterrable."
Summer 2004
"Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 29
This article examines the conventional wisdom that domestic factors and strong antimilitarist norms have constrained Japan’s security policy since the country’s bitter defeat in World War II.
July 2010
"Keeping Kim: How North Korea's Regime Stays in Power"
Policy Brief
By Daniel Byman, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security and Jennifer Lind
"In contrast to the media, which persist in portraying Kim Jong-il as a madman or an incompetent playboy, this analysis shows him to be a shrewd, if reprehensible, leader. His meticulous use of the authoritarian toolbox reveals him to be a skilled strategic player. Kim shows every sign of being rational—and thus deterrable."



