Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 32
New historical evidence reveals that World War I, far from being accidental, was provoked by German leaders who hoped to dominate the European continent, fully aware that the conflict would be long and bloody. They did not have a blueprint for quick victory embodied in the Schlieffen Plan; they did not misjudge the nature of modern war; and they did not lose control of events and attack out of fear of their enemies moving first. This new historiography challenges the core concepts of defensive realism and calls for a reinterpretation of the war as it relates to causes of conflict.
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 31
Jeffrey Lantis, Tom Sauer, and James Wirtz reply to Keir Lieber and Daryl Press's spring 2006 International Security article, "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy."
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 30
Can the United States destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of China and Russia ? Keir Lieber and Daryl Press argue that not only does the United States have a potent first-strike capability, but that the nuclear balance will continue to shift in its favor, creating significant implications for international relations and U.S. foreign policy.
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 30
By Stephen Brooks, Former Fellow, International Security Program, 2003-2004, Robert Art, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1974-1977, 1978-1979; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, William Wohlforth, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander
Some scholars argue that the balance of power theory that explained the bipolar and multipolar systems of the past is irrelevant in a unipolar world. These letters debate the possibility of expanding the traditional definition of "balancing" to account for policies that states are pursuing today.
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 30
There is little credible evidence that major powers are engaging in either hard or soft balancing against the United States. The absence of hard balancing is explained by the lack of underlying motivation to compete strategically with the United Statesunder current conditions. Soft balancing is much ado about nothing: the concept is difficult to define or operationalize; the behavior seems identical to traditional diplomatic friction; and, regardless, specific predictions of soft balancing are not supported by the evidence. Balancing against theUnited Statesis not occurring because contemporaryU.S.grand strategy, despite widespread criticism, poses a threat to only a very limited number of regimes and terrorist groups.
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 25
The author critically assesses the offense-defense theory to determine how technology, in particular, has shaped the relative ease of offense and defense and the probability of war.