Mailing address
One Brattle Square 501
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
79 John F. Kennedy Street, Mailbox 134
Cambridge, MA, 02138
Alexander B. Downes
Research Fellow, International Security Program
Contact:
Telephone: 617-384-8061
Fax: 617-496-0606
Email: alexander_downes@ksg.harvard.edu
Experience
Alexander B. Downes, who received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago, is an assistant professor of political science at Duke University. His thesis, "Targeting Civilians in War," won the American Political Science Association's Helen Dwight Reid Award for best dissertation in international relations, law, and politics in 2006. His book of the same title is forthcoming from Cornell University Press (2008), and he has published articles in International Security, Security Studies, and SAIS Review.
March 2008
Targeting Civilians in War
Book
By Alexander B. Downes, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Accidental harm to civilians in warfare often becomes an occasion for public outrage, from citizens of both the victimized and the victimizing nation. In this vitally important book on a topic of acute concern for anyone interested in military strategy, international security, or human rights, Alexander B. Downes reminds readers that democratic and authoritarian governments alike will sometimes deliberately kill large numbers of civilians as a matter of military strategy. What leads governments to make such a choice?
AP Photo
December 2007
"Restraint or Propellant? Democracy and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars"
Journal Article, Journal of Conflict Resolution, issue 6, volume 51
By Alexander B. Downes, Research Fellow, International Security Program
This article investigates the effect of regime type on the number of civilian fatalities that states inflicted in interstate wars between 1900 and 2003. As opposed to several previous studies, the author finds little support for normative arguments positing that democracies kill fewer civilians in war.
AP Photo
December 2007
"Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy"
Journal Article, Civil Wars, The Origins and Effectiveness of Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Strategies, issue 4, volume 9
By Alexander B. Downes, Research Fellow, International Security Program
"It is commonly believed in the literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency that to be effective in undermining civilian support for guerrillas, violence against noncombatants must be selective or risk alienating the population. Yet cases exist where governments have defeated insurgencies by wielding indiscriminate violence against noncombatants. This paper explores the conditions under which such violence can be effective through a case study of British counterinsurgency strategy in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902)."
December 2007
"Introduction: Modern Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Comparative Perspective"
Journal Article, Civil Wars, The Origins and Effectiveness of Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Strategies, issue 4, volume 9
By Alexander B. Downes, Research Fellow, International Security Program
"Why do individuals and groups take up arms to wage guerrilla insurgencies? How are insurgent groups organized, and what strategies and tactics do they use? What determines how insurgent groups treat civilian populations? How can states best defeat insurgencies? Is violence—including the killing of civilians—an effective tool of counterinsurgency (COIN), or are softer 'hearts and minds' strategies more likely to yield results?"
Spring 2006
"Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 30
By Alexander B. Downes, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Despite international norms and injunctions against using civilians as targets, as well as all indications that targeting civilians is rarely, if ever, effective, belligerents continue to engage in this behavior. Two variables—desperation to win and reduce casualties on one's own side, and the intention to conquer enemy territory—explain this phenomenon.
