Matthew Kroenig
Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
Experience
Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
Current Affiliation: Assistant Professor, Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
AP Photo
February 21, 2012
"Ask the Experts: What Would Iran Do With a Bomb?"
Op-Ed, Politics, Power, and Preventive Action, A Council on Foreign Relations Blog
By Micah Zenko, Former Research Assistant to Graham Allison, 2003–2006; Former Research Associate, Project on Managing The Atom, 2006–2008, Kyle Beardsley, Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008, Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008, Annie Tracy Samuel, Research Fellow, International Security Program and Todd Sechser, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2004–2006
"Iran's leaders, like those in other states, want to remain in power. They want the regime in which they have invested and which serves their interests to endure. Foreign policy, in addition to safeguarding Iran's borders and national integrity, is a means for safeguarding the regime. Possession of a nuclear weapon will likely make Iran more impervious to attack and may make Iran bolder in its support for armed groups. However, possessing a nuclear weapon will is not likely to alter Iran's paramount foreign policy goals of national and regime security."
White House Photo
July 30, 2011
"Nuclear Zero? Why Not Nuclear Infinity?"
Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
"The primary purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is to deter our enemies and assure our friends. No adversary would be restrained by the fear of attack from a nonexistent nuclear arsenal. But the prospect of fighting an adversary with unlimited nuclear firepower would induce much more caution even in our most reckless enemies."
AP Photo
February 23, 2011
"Egypt's Future Needs a Strong Legislature"
Op-Ed, CNN.com
By M. Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
"If Egyptians are to have a chance at a democratic future, their new constitution must confer considerable authority on the People's Assembly, including the right to remove the chief executive from office, question and investigate executive branch officials, oversee the armed forces and the police, and approve or reject Cabinet appointments. Furthermore, the executive must be deprived of the power to issue decrees or appoint members of the legislature."
AP Photo
November 2010
"Taking Soft Power Seriously"
Journal Article, Comparative Strategy, issue 5, volume 29
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008, Melissa McAdam and Steven Weber
The term soft power is entrenched in the theory and practice of American foreign policy, yet scholars have not yet developed, or empirically tested, a theory about the conditions under which governments can use soft power to their advantage—and that makes good policy hard to design. Drawing on research from the fields of communications, social psychology, and international relations theory, we develop a theory about the conditions under which state efforts to employ soft power will be most likely to succeed.
Summer 2010
"Correspondence: Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 35
By Christoph Bluth, Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008, Rensselaer Lee, William Sailor and Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
Christoph Bluth, Matthew Kroenig, Rensselaer Lee, and William Sailor respond to Matthew Fuhrmann's summer 2009 International Security article, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements."
April 2010
Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
Book
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
Matthew Kroenig's book, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, was published by Cornell University Press. Kroenig argues that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.
AP Photo
February 9, 2010
"Bombs Away"
Op-Ed, The New Republic
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
"Some analysts argue that we shouldn't worry about proliferation in Iran because nuclear deterrence will work, much like it worked during the Cold War. But from Washington's point of view, this is precisely the problem; it is more often than not the United States that will be deterred. Although Washington might not have immediate plans to use force in the Middle East, it would like to keep the option open."
November 2009
"Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation"
Working Paper
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
Matthew Kroenig examines the effect of the spread of nuclear weapons on international politics in a Managing the Atom Working Paper. He observes that the spread of nuclear weapons threatens some states more than others, and proposes a theory of nuclear proliferation that examines the differential effects of proliferation. He argues that the threat nuclear proliferation poses to a particular state depends on that state’s ability to project military power. The spread of nuclear weapons is worse for states that have the ability to project conventional military power over a potential nuclear weapon state because nuclear proliferation constrains their conventional military freedom of action.
AP Photo
May 28, 2009
"Look at the Bright Side"
Op-Ed, USA Today
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
"Others worry that North Korea, with its economy in shambles, will sell nuclear materials to earn hard currency. However, my research demonstrates that countries transfer nuclear technology for strategic, not economic, reasons. It is extremely unlikely, for example, that North Korea would sell nuclear technology to terrorists because of potentially devastating consequences. If the terrorists used those weapons on the U.S., it could spur massive retaliation against North Korea. The upside for the U.S.? It's much easier to deal with a country motivated by realpolitik than one blindly willing to trade away its security for a few bucks."
April 1, 2009
"A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation"
Journal Article, Journal of Conflict Resolution, issue 2, volume 53
By Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
Gartzke and Kroenig examine why states acquire nuclear weapons, why they engage in nuclear cooperation, and explore the relationship between nuclear weapons possession and a variety of security and diplomatic outcomes. This list does not cover the full range of possible nuclear proliferation issues that could be subjected to scholarly scrutiny, but they offer several advantages for our research. First, these outcomes are substantively important. Second, they can be measured, allowing them to quantitatively analyze nuclear proliferation across cases and over time. Third, this list covers a broader range of outcomes than are considered in the existing literature.
