Matthew Kroenig
Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
April 2010
Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
Book
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
Matthew Kroenig's book, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, was published by Cornell University Press. Kroenig argues that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.
AP Photo
November 2010
"Taking Soft Power Seriously"
Journal Article, Comparative Strategy, issue 5, volume 29
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008, Melissa McAdam and Steven Weber
The term soft power is entrenched in the theory and practice of American foreign policy, yet scholars have not yet developed, or empirically tested, a theory about the conditions under which governments can use soft power to their advantage—and that makes good policy hard to design. Drawing on research from the fields of communications, social psychology, and international relations theory, we develop a theory about the conditions under which state efforts to employ soft power will be most likely to succeed.
Summer 2010
"Correspondence: Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 35
By Christoph Bluth, Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008, Rensselaer Lee, William Sailor and Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
Christoph Bluth, Matthew Kroenig, Rensselaer Lee, and William Sailor respond to Matthew Fuhrmann's summer 2009 International Security article, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements."
April 1, 2009
"A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation"
Journal Article, Journal of Conflict Resolution, issue 2, volume 53
By Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
Gartzke and Kroenig examine why states acquire nuclear weapons, why they engage in nuclear cooperation, and explore the relationship between nuclear weapons possession and a variety of security and diplomatic outcomes. This list does not cover the full range of possible nuclear proliferation issues that could be subjected to scholarly scrutiny, but they offer several advantages for our research. First, these outcomes are substantively important. Second, they can be measured, allowing them to quantitatively analyze nuclear proliferation across cases and over time. Third, this list covers a broader range of outcomes than are considered in the existing literature.
April 1, 2009
"Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation"
Journal Article, Journal of Conflict Resolution, issue 2, volume 53
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
Matthew Kroenig's article "Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation" argues that sensitive nuclear transfers are an important determinant of nuclear proliferation. In broader terms, Kroenig finds strong support for a supply-side approach to nuclear proliferation. States that are better able to produce nuclear weapons, due to either international assistance or domestic capacity, are more likely to do so.
February 2009
"Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance"
Journal Article, American Political Science Review, issue 1, volume 103
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
Why do states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons? Using a new dataset on sensitive nuclear transfers, this paper analyzes the determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. Dr. Kroenig first describes a simple logic of the differential effects of nuclear proliferation, which is used to generate hypotheses about the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance. He then shows that the strategic characteristics of the potential nuclear suppliers are the most important determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. Explanations that emphasize the importance of economic motivations do not find support in the data. This paper presents a new approach to the study of the spread of nuclear weapons, focusing on the supply side of nuclear proliferation.
AP Photo
March/April 2008
"Power House"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, Foreign Policy, (Inbox Section), issue 165
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
"When Kenya convulsed with violence after its flawed election in late December, many expressed surprise that one of Africa’s most stable countries could so quickly fall victim to ethnic hatred. But political scientists Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig noted something else: a feeble legislature. Despite the opposition winning twice as many legislative seats as the president’s party, opposition members still took to the streets. Why? Because they wanted the only office that has any power in the country: the presidency...."
AP Photo
February 21, 2012
"Ask the Experts: What Would Iran Do With a Bomb?"
Op-Ed, Politics, Power, and Preventive Action, A Council on Foreign Relations Blog
By Micah Zenko, Former Research Assistant to Graham Allison, 2003–2006; Former Research Associate, Project on Managing The Atom, 2006–2008, Kyle Beardsley, Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008, Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008, Annie Tracy Samuel, Research Fellow, International Security Program and Todd Sechser, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2004–2006
"Iran's leaders, like those in other states, want to remain in power. They want the regime in which they have invested and which serves their interests to endure. Foreign policy, in addition to safeguarding Iran's borders and national integrity, is a means for safeguarding the regime. Possession of a nuclear weapon will likely make Iran more impervious to attack and may make Iran bolder in its support for armed groups. However, possessing a nuclear weapon will is not likely to alter Iran's paramount foreign policy goals of national and regime security."
White House Photo
July 30, 2011
"Nuclear Zero? Why Not Nuclear Infinity?"
Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
"The primary purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is to deter our enemies and assure our friends. No adversary would be restrained by the fear of attack from a nonexistent nuclear arsenal. But the prospect of fighting an adversary with unlimited nuclear firepower would induce much more caution even in our most reckless enemies."
AP Photo
February 23, 2011
"Egypt's Future Needs a Strong Legislature"
Op-Ed, CNN.com
By M. Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
"If Egyptians are to have a chance at a democratic future, their new constitution must confer considerable authority on the People's Assembly, including the right to remove the chief executive from office, question and investigate executive branch officials, oversee the armed forces and the police, and approve or reject Cabinet appointments. Furthermore, the executive must be deprived of the power to issue decrees or appoint members of the legislature."
