Matthew Fuhrmann
Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Contact:
Email: Matthew_Fuhrmann@hks.harvard.edu
Website: http://people.cas.sc.edu/fuhrmann/
Experience
Matthew Fuhrmann is an Affiliate with the Belfer Center's Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) and a former joint research fellow with MTA and the International Security Program (ISP). He is currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina.
His research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, nuclear energy, and civil war. It has been published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Conflict Management and Peace Science, and Foreign Policy Analysis, among other journals. He is currently completing a book project examining why countries help one another develop civil nuclear energy programs and what consequences result from this assistance. Other active projects examine the consequences of attacks against nuclear programs, the causes of radiological/nuclear terrorism, and the strategies countries adopt when pursuing nuclear weapons.
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
Discussion Paper
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007-2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
Summer 2009
"Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 34
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," was published by in the Summer 2009 issue of International Security. In his article, Dr. Fuhrmann argues "Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs."
Summer 2009
"Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements"
International Security Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 34
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," was published by in the Summer 2009 issue of International Security. In his article, Dr. Fuhrmann argues "Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs."
April 1, 2009
"Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation"
Journal Article, Journal of Conflict Resolution, issue 2, volume 53
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation," argues that countries provide civil nuclear assistance for three strategic reasons: to strengthen their allies and alliances, to strengthen their relationship with enemies of enemies, and to strengthen existing democracies and bilateral relationships with these countries. The hypotheses are tested using a new data set on more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements signed between 1950 and 2000.
September 2008
"Exporting Mass Destruction? The Determinants of Dual-Use Trade"
Journal Article, Journal of Peace Research, issue 5, volume 45
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
This study applies well-known arguments on the effect of conflict, alliances, and democracy on international trade to identify the determinants of dual-use trade. Dual-use commodities are those that can be used in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs or in legitimate civilian applications. This article advances a theory suggesting that governments seeking to maximize the gains from dual-use trade will promote exports to countries where there are security guarantees and restrict exports to countries where security threats exist.
March 14, 2008
"Legalizing Nuclear Abandonment: The Determinants of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty Ratification"
Working Paper
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom and Xiaojun Li
Matthew Fuhrmann and co-author Xiaojun Li examine when and why states ratify regional nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) treaties.
February 29, 2008
"Oil for Nukes — Mostly a Bad Idea"
Op-Ed, Christian Science Monitor
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
"...In 1975, France signed an agreement with Iraq authorizing the export of a research reactor and highly enriched uranium. According to French officials at the time, their aim was to obtain a permanent and secure oil supply from a country that provided 20 percent of its oil.
It worked. But it also had tremendous consequences for international and regional security."
January 2008
"Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991-92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives"
Journal Article, Foreign Policy Analysis, issue 1, volume 4
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom and Bryan Early, Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative
The article explains why in September 1991, shortly after the attempted putsch against Gorbachev, George H.W. Bush launched the unilateral Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). The PNIs were measures that led to the largest reductions in the American and Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals to date The article argues that an explanation rooted in prospect theory and a focus on Bush as an individual decision-maker offers the most explanatory power.



