Matthew Fuhrmann
Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
AP Photo
April 26, 2011
"Nuclear Inertia"
Op-Ed, Slate
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
"Nuclear-reactor construction is dominated by inertia. Harvesting nuclear energy is incredibly expensive at first, but much cheaper once the infrastructure is in place. Nevertheless, countries with a lot of money invested in nuclear energy have been surprisingly reluctant to give it up—even after major nuclear accidents. States that were not heavily invested, however, have often been quick to cancel their nuclear plans after accidents in other countries."
AP Photo
April 2011
"Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?"
Journal Article, The Journal of Strategic Studies, issue 2, volume 34
By Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008 and Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
"What does the historical record suggest about the consequences of a potential American or Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear program? Although military force delayed proliferation in some previous cases, policymakers must remember that past may not be prologue. In particular, the three indirect mechanisms we identified are unlikely to 'work' in the Iranian case."
Summer 2010
"Correspondence: Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 35
By Christoph Bluth, Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008, Rensselaer Lee, William Sailor and Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
Christoph Bluth, Matthew Kroenig, Rensselaer Lee, and William Sailor respond to Matthew Fuhrmann's summer 2009 International Security article, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements."
AP Photo
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
Discussion Paper
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009 and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
AP Photo
Summer 2009
"Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 34
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," was published by in the Summer 2009 issue of International Security. In his article, Dr. Fuhrmann argues "Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs."
State Dept
Summer 2009
"Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements"
International Security Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 34
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," was published by in the Summer 2009 issue of International Security. In his article, Dr. Fuhrmann argues "Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs."
April 1, 2009
"Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation"
Journal Article, Journal of Conflict Resolution, issue 2, volume 53
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation," argues that countries provide civil nuclear assistance for three strategic reasons: to strengthen their allies and alliances, to strengthen their relationship with enemies of enemies, and to strengthen existing democracies and bilateral relationships with these countries. The hypotheses are tested using a new data set on more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements signed between 1950 and 2000.
quinn.anya
March 14, 2008
"Legalizing Nuclear Abandonment: The Determinants of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty Ratification"
Working Paper
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009 and Xiaojun Li
Matthew Fuhrmann and co-author Xiaojun Li examine when and why states ratify regional nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) treaties.
AP Photo
April 2011
"Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?"
Journal Article, The Journal of Strategic Studies, issue 2, volume 34
By Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008 and Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
"What does the historical record suggest about the consequences of a potential American or Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear program? Although military force delayed proliferation in some previous cases, policymakers must remember that past may not be prologue. In particular, the three indirect mechanisms we identified are unlikely to 'work' in the Iranian case."
AP Photo
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
Discussion Paper
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009 and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
