Sarah Kreps
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008
AP Photo
February 21, 2012
"Ask the Experts: What Would Iran Do With a Bomb?"
Op-Ed, Politics, Power, and Preventive Action, A Council on Foreign Relations Blog
By Micah Zenko, Former Research Assistant to Graham Allison, 2003–2006; Former Research Associate, Project on Managing The Atom, 2006–2008, Kyle Beardsley, Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008, Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008, Annie Tracy Samuel, Research Fellow, International Security Program and Todd Sechser, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2004–2006
"Iran's leaders, like those in other states, want to remain in power. They want the regime in which they have invested and which serves their interests to endure. Foreign policy, in addition to safeguarding Iran's borders and national integrity, is a means for safeguarding the regime. Possession of a nuclear weapon will likely make Iran more impervious to attack and may make Iran bolder in its support for armed groups. However, possessing a nuclear weapon will is not likely to alter Iran's paramount foreign policy goals of national and regime security."
AP Photo
April 2011
"Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?"
Journal Article, The Journal of Strategic Studies, issue 2, volume 34
By Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008 and Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
"What does the historical record suggest about the consequences of a potential American or Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear program? Although military force delayed proliferation in some previous cases, policymakers must remember that past may not be prologue. In particular, the three indirect mechanisms we identified are unlikely to 'work' in the Iranian case."
AP Photo
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
Discussion Paper
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009 and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
AP Photo
July-September 2008
"When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan"
Journal Article, Security Studies, issue 3, volume 17
By Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008
"Using the debate between the logic of appropriateness and consequences as a theoretical backdrop, I argue that neither is able to explain the United States' choices between unilateralism and multilateralism in post-Cold War military interventions....In this article, I suggest that "consequences" are best specified according to time horizon, which creates intertemporal tradeoffs between the long-term benefits of multilateralism and immediate payoffs of unilateralism, and the nature of the intervention, which affects the operational payoffs of multilateralism. I test this argument and the existing explanations against the case of Afghanistan. Its within-case variation — largely unilateral in combat operations and robustly multilateral in post-conflict phases — lends strong support to the logic of consequences as specified according to time horizon and operational payoff."
AP Photo
March 6, 2008
"Chávez Rattles His Saber"
Op-Ed, International Herald Tribune
By Gustavo Flores-Macías and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008
"So far, the United States has refrained from responding to Chávez's antagonistic rhetoric. But the U.S. should be prepared for a more active approach if events escalate. The region might object to a direct U.S. military intervention, but Washington might consider quietly stepping up the supply of aid, training and equipment to Colombia."
AP Photo
December 1, 2007
"The United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur: Implications and Prospects for Success"
Journal Article, African Security Review, issue 4, volume 16
By Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008
With the security situation in Darfur remaining grim, the international community passed United Nations Security Resolution 1769 that authorised a more robust peacekeeping force. This article addresses the security concerns motivating the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), highlights the mandate and implications of the force, and compares the potential command and control issues to the experiences of the Somalia intervention in the 1990s. It closes by analysing the prospects for success of the intervention and offering some limited recommendations on ways to mitigate the risks associated with the peacekeeping effort.
AP Photo
April 2011
"Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?"
Journal Article, The Journal of Strategic Studies, issue 2, volume 34
By Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008 and Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
"What does the historical record suggest about the consequences of a potential American or Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear program? Although military force delayed proliferation in some previous cases, policymakers must remember that past may not be prologue. In particular, the three indirect mechanisms we identified are unlikely to 'work' in the Iranian case."
AP Photo
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
Discussion Paper
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009 and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
AP Photo
April 2011
"Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?"
Journal Article, The Journal of Strategic Studies, issue 2, volume 34
By Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008 and Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009
"What does the historical record suggest about the consequences of a potential American or Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear program? Although military force delayed proliferation in some previous cases, policymakers must remember that past may not be prologue. In particular, the three indirect mechanisms we identified are unlikely to 'work' in the Iranian case."
AP Photo
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
Discussion Paper
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009 and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
