Dan Reiter
Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
Experience
Dan Reiter is Professor and Chair of Political Science at Emory University.
Fall 2010
"Correspondence: FDR, U.S. Entry into World War II, and Selection Effects Theory"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 35
By Dan Reiter, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security and John Schuessler, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2007
Dan Reiter responds to John Schuessler's Spring 2010 International Security article, "The Deception Dividend: FDR's Undeclared War."
Fall 2009
"Correspondence: Another Skirmish in the Battle over Democracies and War"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 34
By Dan Reiter, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Allan Stam and Alexander B. Downes, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008
Dan Reiter and Allan Stam respond to Alexander Downes's Spring 2009 article "How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War."
Summer 2003
"Understanding Victory: Why Political Institutions Matter"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 28
By Dan Reiter, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security and Allan Stam
Dan Reiter and Allan Stam argue that Desch's decision to slash the number of cases under examination skews his results.
Winter 2001/02
"Correspondence: NATO and Democracy"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 26
By Dan Reiter, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
We close with an exchange of letters between Harvey Waterman, Dessie Zagorcheva, and the author on whether NATO should continue to increase its membership.
Spring 2001
"Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 25
By Dan Reiter, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
The author maintains that historical record—during and after the Cold War—fails to establish any correlation between NATO membership and the expansion of democracy. He also suggests that the costs and risks of NATO enlargement greatly exceed the potential benefits.
