Hui Zhang

July 2001

Economic Aspects of Civilian Reprocessing in China

Conference Paper

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Currently, China is pursuing a long-term expansion of its nuclear power program and plans to reprocess the resulting civilian spent fuel, recycling the plutonium in MOX fuel for LWRs and in fast breeder reactors. China presently operates three civilian nuclear power reactors, but it plans to build about 20 reactors by 2020. A pilot civilian reprocessing plant has been built at Lanzhou, with a capacity 50 metric tons of spent fuel per year. This plant is ready to start operations now. A key decision now hanging in the balance is whether to proceed with expensive plans to build a larger commercial reprocessing plant, with a capacity of up to 800 tons per year, by 2020.

July 2001

Economic Aspects of Civilian Reprocessing in China

Book Chapter

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Currently, China is pursuing a long-term expansion of its nuclear power program and plans to reprocess the resulting civilian spent fuel, recycling the plutonium in MOX fuel for LWRs and in fast breeder reactors. China presently operates three civilian nuclear power reactors, but it plans to build about 20 reactors by 2020. A pilot civilian reprocessing plant has been built at Lanzhou, with a capacity 50 metric tons of spent fuel per year. This plant is ready to start operations now. A key decision now hanging in the balance is whether to proceed with expensive plans to build a larger commercial reprocessing plant, with a capacity of up to 800 tons per year, by 2020. At the same time, China started construction of an experimental fast reactor with a power of 25 MWe in May 2000, and will have to decide whether to build a 300 MWe breeder by 2015, as currently planned. This paper examines whether nuclear reprocessing makes sense for China, taking into account costs, spent fuel management, and proliferation risks. It discusses the status of China''s breeder and civilian reprocessing programs, estimates the cumulative of discharged spent fuel and storage capacity in China, and discussion of economics of reprocessing in China. It concludes that China does not urgently need to pursue civilian reprocessing in the foreseeable future. China should instead use interim storage for its spent fuels.

Nuclear Power in China
As a developing country, China''s current energy consumption per capita is only half of the world average level and one sixth of the advanced developed countries. It is estimated that the energy consumption per capita in China will need to increase about three times by 2050 to meet its economic growth and to increase living standards. China relies on coal for about 70 percent of its primary commercial energy use. China''s vast energy resources lie far from population centers and areas of high energy demand. Increasing China already large consumption of coal would place excessive strains on transportation system and the environment. To address these concerns, China is developing its nuclear power program

July 1, 2001

Discussion of China's Nuclear Transparency Options

Book Chapter

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

This paper will discuss how much nuclear transparency China can afford to adopt in light of the changing international security context. The work will examine China''s attitude toward nuclear transparency; the possible influence of high-resolution satellite imagery on China''s position; what sorts of nuclear transparency China could accept under international arms control and nonproliferation treaties; and what kind of on-site inspections China could accept at its specific nuclear production facility and site under an FMCT.

July / August 2001

Eyes in the Sky: Watching for Weapons Work

Journal Article, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, issue 4, volume 57

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

April, 2001

How US Missile Defense Plans Affect China's Nuclear Arms Control Policies: A Chinese Perspective

Journal Article, Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor, issue 2

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

February, 2001

Eye in the Sky: India, Pakistan and Nuclear Confidence

Journal Article, Himal Southasian, issue 2, volume 14

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

January 18, 2001

US Must Consider How Missile Defense Plan Will Play in China

Op-Ed, Boston Globe

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

September 2000

Using Commercial Imaging Satellites to Detect the Operation of Plutonium-Production Reactors and Gaseous-Diffusion Plants?

Journal Article, Science & Global Security, issue 3, volume 8

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom and Frank N. von Hippel

The operation of dedicated plutonium-production reactors and large gaseous-diffusion uranium-enrichment plants (GDPs), can be detected remotely using commercial observation-satellite imagery. Declassified Corona imagery is used to demonstrate that the new generation of commercial observation satellites with 1-meter spatial resolution will be able to detect vapor plumes inside and downwind from large operating natural-draft cooling towers. Low-resolution Landsat-5 thermal infrared images have been shown by other authors to be able to detect warm water discharges from reactors into lakes, rivers, etc. Here, the same systems are shown to be able detect the elevated temperature of the roofs of large operating GDPs. Commercial-satellite observations could therefore play an important role in increasing confidence in declarations that plutonium-production reactors and GDPs have been shut down as a result of a fissile material-production moratorium or Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

August 1, 2000

Building Confidence in a Fissile Materials Production Moratorium Using Commercial Satellite Imagery

Journal Article, Disarmament Forum, issue 3, volume 2000

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

One key building block in a comprehensive strategy to contain and eliminate nuclear weapons is the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which would ban the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. However, negotiations on this treaty have been at an impasse in Geneva since 1993. Since realistically a FMCT will probably not come into force for some years, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons should be encouraged in order to capture as many of the benefits of an FMCT in the interim.

July 19, 2000

Detecting Undeclared Reprocessing Activities through Sampling Analysis

Conference Paper

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom