Hui Zhang

May 25, 2000

Ending the n-race

Op-Ed, The Hindu

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

AFTER THEIR nuclear tests in May 1998, the Governments of India and Pakistan sought to placate international criticism by announcing that they did not intend conducting more tests and promising to control nuclear technology exports. They have also not yet deployed nuclear weapons. But, India and Pakistan have continued building up stocks of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in a fissile material race with profound economic, environmental and health consequences for their people. Stopping this race would benefit both countries. Using newly available commercial satellite images they could verify a production freeze independently with considerable confidence

May, 2000

Using Commercial Observation Satellites to Verify that Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Diffusion Plants are Not Operating

Report

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

April 2000

No First Use: One Key Step Toward the NWC

Journal Article, Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor, issue April, volume Issue 1

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Nuclear weapons have the capability to destroy all the creatures of this Earth. As long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a danger of accidental or deliberate use with disastrous consequences. Therefore, the negotiation of a NWC is vital to all humanity. However, such negotiations have not started yet because of the opposition of the nuclear weapon states (except China). The NWC negotiations will not make progress without these states’ participation. The main reason for these nuclear states’ objections to NWC negotiations is that they continue to rely on the deterrence role of nuclear weapons, despite there being no rationale for deterrence since the end of the Cold War. To reach the goal of the NWC, therefore, the major steps are to reduce the deterrence role of nuclear weapons and to render such weapons unusable.

August 1999

Potential Application of Commercial Observation Satellite Imagery for the Verification of Declared and Undeclared Nuclear Production Facilities

Book Chapter

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) will soon be underway at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, and will include detailed attention to how such a treaty could be verified. This paper explains how commercial observation satellites can be effective in verifying that reactors used to produce weapons plutonium in the past are kept in a shutdown status under a cutoff treaty or moratorium. The satellites considered are the new-generation satellites with fine spatial resolution images in the visible and near infrared band complemented by thermal infrared images with lower-spatial resolution but good temperature resolution. These satellites can also contribute to the detection of undeclared nuclear-reactor sites and suspicious construction activities.

February 15, 2013

"North Korea's Third Nuclear Test: Plutonium or Highly Enriched Uranium?"

Op-Ed, Power & Policy Blog

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

"North Korea has only a small supply of plutonium—material that it had stopped producing by 2008—and had more recently demonstrated an operational capability to enrich uranium, which would support a much larger arsenal of weapons given North Korea's huge deposits of natural uranium.... However, the seismic signals are useless in this regard. The question is, then, can the off-site environmental sampling analysis distinguish a plutonium explosion from a HEU explosion?"

December 2004

"Chinese Perspectives on the Prevention of Space Weaponization"

Journal Article, INESAP Bulletin, issue 24

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

This paper was written for the conference "The Challenge of Hiroshima. Alternatives to Nuclear Weapons, Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Space Weaponization in a Northeast Asian Context" organized by INESAP and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation on October 8-11, 2004, in Hiroshima, Japan.

Summer 2007

"Revisiting North Korea's Nuclear Test"

Journal Article, China Security, issue 3, volume 3

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Hui Zhang re-examines the North Korean explosion on October 9, 2006. His research suggests that the test was likely not a failure if Pyongyang had planned for a yield of 4 kt, as it told Beijing prior to the event.

IKONOS satellite/AFP

January / February 2007

"The North Korean Test and the Limits of Nuclear Forensics"

Magazine or Newspaper Article, Arms Control Today, (Letter to the Editor)

By Jungmin Kang, Frank N. von Hippel and Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Hui Zhang provides a path-breaking technical assessment of the Korean nuclear test, publishing a comment (with co-authors Jungmin Kang and Frank von Hippel) on the test and the limits of nuclear forensics in Arms Control Today.

Summer 2002

A Chinese View on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

Journal Article, Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, issue 4, volume 30

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

November 1, 2001

"Strengthening IAEA Safeguards Using High-Resolution Commercial Satellite Imagery"

Conference Paper

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom