Hui Zhang

February, 2001

Eye in the Sky: India, Pakistan and Nuclear Confidence

Journal Article, Himal Southasian, issue 2, volume 14

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

January 18, 2001

US Must Consider How Missile Defense Plan Will Play in China

Op-Ed, Boston Globe

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

September 2000

Using Commercial Imaging Satellites to Detect the Operation of Plutonium-Production Reactors and Gaseous-Diffusion Plants?

Journal Article, Science & Global Security, issue 3, volume 8

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom and Frank N. von Hippel

The operation of dedicated plutonium-production reactors and large gaseous-diffusion uranium-enrichment plants (GDPs), can be detected remotely using commercial observation-satellite imagery. Declassified Corona imagery is used to demonstrate that the new generation of commercial observation satellites with 1-meter spatial resolution will be able to detect vapor plumes inside and downwind from large operating natural-draft cooling towers. Low-resolution Landsat-5 thermal infrared images have been shown by other authors to be able to detect warm water discharges from reactors into lakes, rivers, etc. Here, the same systems are shown to be able detect the elevated temperature of the roofs of large operating GDPs. Commercial-satellite observations could therefore play an important role in increasing confidence in declarations that plutonium-production reactors and GDPs have been shut down as a result of a fissile material-production moratorium or Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

August 1, 2000

Building Confidence in a Fissile Materials Production Moratorium Using Commercial Satellite Imagery

Journal Article, Disarmament Forum, issue 3, volume 2000

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

One key building block in a comprehensive strategy to contain and eliminate nuclear weapons is the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which would ban the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. However, negotiations on this treaty have been at an impasse in Geneva since 1993. Since realistically a FMCT will probably not come into force for some years, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons should be encouraged in order to capture as many of the benefits of an FMCT in the interim.

July 19, 2000

Detecting Undeclared Reprocessing Activities through Sampling Analysis

Conference Paper

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

July 16, 2000

Potential Application of Commercial Observation Satellite Imagery for the Verification of Declared and Undeclared Nuclear Production Facilities

Conference Paper

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

July 2000

Detecting Undeclared Reprocessing Activities Through Sampling Activities

Book Chapter

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Summer 2000

"Uses of Commerical Satellite Imagery in FMCT Verification"

Journal Article, Nonproliferation Review, issue 2, volume 7

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) may soon be launched at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva after several years' delay caused by debates over its scope and linkage to nuclear disarmament measures. Fissile material, in practice plutonium or HEU, is the fundamental ingredient in all nuclear weapons. It is also the most difficult and expensive part to produce. A global, verified ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives would be a key building block in a comprehensive strategy to contain and eliminate nuclear weapons.

May 25, 2000

Ending the n-race

Op-Ed, The Hindu

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

AFTER THEIR nuclear tests in May 1998, the Governments of India and Pakistan sought to placate international criticism by announcing that they did not intend conducting more tests and promising to control nuclear technology exports. They have also not yet deployed nuclear weapons. But, India and Pakistan have continued building up stocks of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in a fissile material race with profound economic, environmental and health consequences for their people. Stopping this race would benefit both countries. Using newly available commercial satellite images they could verify a production freeze independently with considerable confidence

May, 2000

Using Commercial Observation Satellites to Verify that Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Diffusion Plants are Not Operating

Report

By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom