Paul Doty
Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus
Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
AP Photo
Fall 2009
"The Minimum Deterrent & Beyond"
Journal Article, Daedalus, issue 4, volume 138
By Paul Doty, Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus
"...[A] primary goal in the next decades must be to remove this risk of near global self-destruction by drastically reducing nuclear forces to a level where this outcome is not possible, but where a deterrent value is preserved — in other words, to a level of minimum deterrence. This conception was widely discussed in the early years of the nuclear era, but it drowned in the Cold War flood of weaponry. No matter how remote the risk of civilization collapse may seem now — despite its being so vivid only a few decades ago — the elimination of this risk, for this century and centuries to come, must be a primary driver for radical reductions in nuclear weapons."
December 1999
"The Forgotten Menace"
Op-Ed, Nature, volume 402
By Paul Doty, Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus
“The passage from one millennium to the next is a powerful stimulus to reflect on our most vital problems. Top of the list must be the legacy that this century bequeaths to the next and to the millennium beyond — the risk that the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons left over from the Cold War will bring an end to civilization,” warns Belfer Center founder Paul Doty writing in Nature magazine. “While many informed people felt this threat during the Cold War, a sense of relief from imminent danger has been the hallmark of the first post-Cold War decade. As the concern over a global apocalypse has subsided it has been replaced by the threat of the use of one or a few weapons by accident, by terrorists or by ‘rogue’ nations.”
Winter 1991
"Arms Control: 1960, 1990, 2020"
Journal Article, Daedalus, issue 1, volume 121
By Paul Doty, Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus
"Looking back over the three decades since arms control was codified in the nuclear age, it is clear that, both in concept and in practice, it has become a central feature of the military and political landscape. Nevertheless, it remains a conception in the service of policy, not an end in itself," writes Paul Doty in his analysis of the history and future of contemporary arms control.
Spring 1987
"A Nuclear Test Ban"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, Foreign Affairs, issue 4, volume 65
By Paul Doty, Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus
"Nuclear detonations are constant reminders of mankind's capacity for violence," Paul Doty, founder of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in a Foreign Affairs article arguing for a comprehensive test-ban (ctb) treaty, "it is not surprising that people and governments conclude that if this symptom of supreme violence were exorcised, the risk of nuclear war itself would diminish."
April 13, 1983
"Moral Dilemmas and Nuclear Strategy"
Op-Ed, Christian Science Monitor
By Paul Doty, Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus, Albert Carnesale, Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Stanley Hoffmann, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Samuel Huntington, Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor and Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
"Can nuclear strategy and morality be compatible....[and] can initiating the use of nuclear weapons ever be morally justified?"" asks Harvard University's Nuclear Study Group in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed released.
April 3, 1979
"Why The Senate Should Rafity SALT II"
Op-Ed, New York Times
By Paul Doty, Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus
Writing in response to an op-ed published in the New York Times by Jeremy T. Stone, director of the Federation of American Scientists, Paul Doty, speaking on behalf of his F.A.S. colleagues, writes that "we do not believe that the goal of SALT, as purported by Stone, is the SALT process itself. We Believe that the objective of any SALT agreement must be the enhancement of security through progress in limiting strategic weapons. We are less concerned that the failure to ratify the SALT II treaty might have damaging effects of the SALT process than we are concerned that a failure to ratify will be an irreparable setback to the goal of getting the dangerous strategic arms race under control."
April 2, 1979
"A Defense of the SALT II Treaty"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Paul Doty, Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus
Defending SALT II against “the increasingly familiar catalog of half-truths and flawed analyses by which many hardliners are seeking to frighten Americans, defeat SALT and inaugurate a military buildup far beyond our needs,” Paul Doty, founder of the Belfer Center, argues that “perhaps the most underappreciated feature of SALT II is the agreement...to limit the number of warheads per missile to the maximum number thus far tested on that type of missile. This reduces by more than half the number of weapons the Soviets could eventually have mounted on the ICBM’s and by doing so makes protective measures, such as multiple aim point systems for our own ICBM’s, possible.
March 13, 1979
"Underappreciated Features of SALT II"
Op-Ed, Washington Post
By Paul Doty, Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus
"Perhaps the most underappreciated feature of SALT II is the agreement recently reported to limit the number of war-heads per missile to the maximum number thus far tested on that type of missile," Belfer Center founder Paul Doty writes in a Washington Post op-ed. "This reduces by more than half the number of weapons the Soviets could eventually have mounted on their ICBMs, and by doing so makes protective measures such as multiple aim point systems (MAPS) for our own ICBMs possible."
Winter 1978-1979
"Arms Control Enters the Gray Area"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 3
By Paul Doty, Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus and Robert Metzger, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1977-1978
"If a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty is reached and ratified, ceilings and subceilings will have been placed on the number of launchers from which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could attack each other over intercontinental distances," the Belfer Center's Paul Doty and Robert Metzger write in an International Security article, "Yet, progress in reductions could be an illusion if at least a start is not made in bringing weapons of lesser range under control. These are the gray area weapons that can reach targets 400 to 2,000 miles or more distant from the point of launch....These gray area weapons unconstrained by either SALT or MBFR consist of a wide array of medium bombers, fighter- bombers, carrier aircraft, intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles."
October 1976
"The Race To Control Nuclear Arms"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, Foreign Affairs, issue 1, volume 55
By Paul Doty, Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus, Michael Nacht, Former Associate Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 1973-1984 and Albert Carnesale, Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
In a 1976 article in Foreign Affairs, the Kennedy School's Albert Carnesale, Paul Doty and Michael Nacht argue that "As the nuclear age lengthens and the opportunity for viewing it in perspective grows, its essential features seem increasingly related to successive eight-year American presidential administrations. Measures to control nuclear weapons have been seriously considered in each of the first four postwar "octades," and there has been an acceleration in the number of agreements reached - most notably in limiting nuclear tests, slowing nuclear proliferation, restraining the quantitative growth of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals, and restricting defenses against nuclear weapons."
