Steven E. Miller

AP Photo

Fall 2009

"Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?"

Journal Article, Daedalus, issue 4, volume 138

By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security

Will the growth of nuclear power lead to increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism? Will the nonproliferation regime be adequate to ensure safety and security in a world more widely and heavily invested in nuclear power? The authors in this two-volume (Fall 2009 and Winter 2010) special issue of Dædalus have one simple and clear answer to these questions: It depends.

Spring 2007

"Center’s Efforts Impact Nuclear Policy"

Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter

By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

The abortive coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow in August 1991 raised in a stark and alarming way the question of who was controlling the Soviet arsenal at a moment of extraordinary political instability. The subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union raised the equally consequential question of who would inherit the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The ensuing and ongoing political instability and economic travails in Russia raised the question of the safety and security of the Russian nuclear arsenal and nuclear empire. In view of the fact that these weapons and associated nuclear materials constitute the largest potential threat to the United States and its allies, and given the potential of Russian nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials to fuel terrorism and nuclear proliferation, this is one of the most significant security issues of the post-Cold War era. Work on the safety and security of Russian nuclear holdings soon led to concern about the adequacy of custodial arrangements for nuclear weapons and nuclear materials on a global scale. Meanwhile, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted the danger that a terrorist group might obtain nuclear weapons and inflict an even more terrible attack.

March, 1996

Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material

Book

By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School, Owen R. Coté, Editor, International Security, Richard A. Falkenrath, Former Assistant Professor of Public Policy; Former Principal Investigator, Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness; Former Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

What if the bomb that exploded in Oklahoma City or New York's World Trade Center had used 100 pounds of highly enriched uranium? The destruction would have been far more vast. This danger is not so remote: the recipe for making such a bomb is simple, and soon the ingredients might be easily attained. Thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium from the weapons complex of the former Soviet Union, poorly guarded and poorly accounted for, could soon leak on to a vast emerging nuclear black market.

April 2012

"Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime"

Paper

By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Wael Al-Assad, Jayantha Dhanapala, C. Raja Mohan and Ta Minh Tuan

Nearly all of the 190 signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agree that the forty-two-year-old treaty is fragile and in need of fundamental reform. But gaining consensus on how to fix the NPT will require reconciling the sharply differing views of nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Strengthening the international rules is increasingly important as dozens of countries, including some with unstable political environments, explore nuclear energy. The result is an ever-increasing distribution of this technology. In this paper, Steven E. Miller outlines the main points of contention within the NPT regime and identifies the issues that have made reform so difficult.

AP Photo

January/February 2012

"Nuclear Weapons 2011: Momentum Slows, Reality Returns"

Journal Article, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, issue 1, volume 68

By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

In the Doomsday Clock issue of the Bulletin, the author takes a look at five events that unfolded in 2011 and that seem certain to cast a powerful shadow in months and years to come. No new breakthroughs occurred, the author writes, adding that 2012 could be a much more difficult year.

September 2010

"A Deeply Fractured Regime: Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference"

Journal Article, The International Spectator Italian Journal of International Affairs, issue 3, volume 45

By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

The United States had mixed results at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. On the one hand, it avoided the isolation and criticism directed at Washington in connection with the failed 2005 Review Conference, in large measure because the Obama administration took more congenial positions on a number of nuclear issues. Its cooperation also facilitated the successful achievement of a consensus final document. On the other hand, there was wide resistance to a number of measures for strengthening the NPT system favoured or promoted by the United States, resistance that reveals deep and worrying divisions within the regime.

2011

Do Democracies Win Their Wars?

International Security Reader

By Michael E. Brown, Editorial Board Member and Former Co-Editor, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Owen R. Coté, Editor, International Security, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security and Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

In recent years, a new wave of scholarship has argued that democracies have unique advantages that enable them to compete vigorously in international politics. Challenging long-held beliefs--some of which go back to Thucydides’ account of the clash between democratic Athens and authoritarian Sparta--that democracy is a liability in the harsh world of international affairs, many scholars now claim that democracies win most of their wars. [This research suggests that democracies emerge victorious because they prudently choose to fight wars that they can win, and because they can marshal more resources, make better decisions, and muster public support for their military campaigns.] Critics counter that democracy itself makes little difference in war and that other factors, such as overall power, determine whether a country tastes victory or defeat. In some cases, such as the Vietnam War, democracy may even have contributed to defeat.

The book includes crucial contributions to the debate over democracy and military victory, presenting important theoretical, conceptual, and empirical arguments.

January 2010

Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century

International Security Reader

By Michael E. Brown, Editorial Board Member and Former Co-Editor, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Owen R. Coté, Editor, International Security, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security and Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

The spread of nuclear weapons is one of the most significant challenges to global security in the twenty-first century. Limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials may be the key to preventing a nuclear war or a catastrophic act of nuclear terrorism. Going Nuclear offers conceptual, historical, and analytical perspectives on current problems in controlling nuclear proliferation. It includes essays that examine why countries seek nuclear weapons as well as studies of the nuclear programs of India, Pakistan, and South Africa.

AP Photo

Winter 2010

"Alternative Nuclear Futures"

Journal Article, Daedalus, issue 1, volume 139

By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security

"Our crystal ball is not clear enough to predict with confidence whether the global nuclear future will be characterized by peace and prosperity or by conflict and destruction. But we do believe that the choices made in the coming few years will be crucial in determining whether the world can have more nuclear power without more nuclear weapons dangers in the future."

AP Photo

Fall 2009

"Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?"

Journal Article, Daedalus, issue 4, volume 138

By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security

Will the growth of nuclear power lead to increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism? Will the nonproliferation regime be adequate to ensure safety and security in a world more widely and heavily invested in nuclear power? The authors in this two-volume (Fall 2009 and Winter 2010) special issue of Dædalus have one simple and clear answer to these questions: It depends.