Mailing address
124 Mt. Auburn Street Suite 190, Room 145
79 John F. K ennedy Street
Mailbox 121
Cambridge, MA, 02138
Website
Paul Staniland
Research Fellow, International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program
Contact:
Telephone: 617-496-3474
Fax: 617-491-8588
Email: pstan@mit.edu
Website: http://web.mit.edu/pstan/www/
Experience
Paul Staniland is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT. His research studies cohesion and fragmentation in insurgent and paramilitary groups, with a focus on South Asia and Northern Ireland. He has done approximately a year of fieldwork on militant organizations in India and Indian-administered Kashmir, Northern Ireland, and Sri Lanka, studying why some armed groups within each conflict have remained generally disciplined and cohesive, while others have repeatedly splintered and broken into internal feuds. This research focuses on how militant groups embed themselves in, and then shape, preexisting social networks for the purposes of violent rebellion, and the role of state sponsors and diasporas in structuring control over material resources within armed groups.
Other research interests include civil-military relations, ethnic politics, and international security. Paul has published in the Christian Science Monitor, Civil Wars, Security Studies, and the Washington Quarterly, among others. He has spent time at the RAND Corporation and in the offices of U.S. Senator Arlen Specter and Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley.
December 2007
"Ten Ways to Lose at Counterinsurgency"
Journal Article, Civil Wars, The Origins and Effectiveness of Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Strategies, issue 4, volume 9
By Kelly M. Greenhill, Research Fellow, Program on Intrastate Conflict/International Security Program and Paul Staniland, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program
Counterinsurgency is one of the most important topics facing policymakers and scholars. Existing studies of counterinsurgency are very valuable, but sometimes adhere too strictly to sweeping dichotomies and paradigms. This article discusses ten specific mechanisms that lead counterinsurgent governments to squander their generally overwhelming power advantages. This mechanism-based approach can improve both policy and scholarly analysis.
