Robert N. Stavins

AP Photo

November 20, 2008

Obama's Speech on a U.S. Cap-and-Trade System and Global Climate Negotiations

In the News

By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

Robert N. Stavins, Harvard Kennedy School professor and co-director of the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, offered insight and analysis on President-Elect Barack Obama's speech on climate change which was delivered Nov. 18, 2008.

AP Photo

November 12, 2008

"Inspiration for Climate Change"

Op-Ed, Boston Globe

By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

"...[W]ill Obama work with Congress to develop climate strategies that are scientifically sound, economically sensible, and thereby politically pragmatic? Will he take on the difficult task of crafting meaningful climate legislation?

The only politically feasible approach that can make a real dent in the problem is a comprehensive, upstream cap-and-trade system to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 50 to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. The declining cap will increase the cost of polluting, thereby discouraging the use of the most carbon-intensive fossil fuels and providing powerful incentives for energy conservation and technology innovation."

September 2008

"Linkage of Tradable Permit Systems in International Climate Policy Architecture"

Discussion Paper

By Judson Jaffe and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

Cap-and-trade systems have emerged as the preferred national and regional instrument for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases throughout the industrialized world, and the Clean Development Mechanism — an international emission-reduction-credit system — has developed a substantial constituency, despite some concerns about its performance. Because linkage between tradable permit systems can reduce compliance costs and improve market liquidity, there is great interest in linking cap-and-trade systems to each other, as well as to the CDM and other credit systems. We examine the benefits and concerns associated with various types of linkages, and analyze the near-term and long-term role that linkage may play in a future international climate policy architecture.

AP Photo

September 3, 2008

"The Role of Technology Policies in an International Climate Agreement"

Paper

By Joseph E. Aldy, Faculty Affiliate, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements has agreed to help the Office of the Danish Prime Minister, in its role as incoming President of the 2009 Conference of the Parties, to prepare background papers and on-site briefings for a series of very high-level dialogues on climate change policy, hosted by the Prime Minister. These dialogues will each include about 25 participants, including CEOs of European and U.S. corporations, key officials from national governments and intergovernmental organizations, and leaders of major environmental NGOs. This paper on the subject of technology policies was prepared by the Harvard Project leadership for the second dialogue.

May 2008

Climate Change: Expert Opinion on the Economics of Policy Options to Address Climate Change

Report

By U.S. Government Accountability Office, Joseph E. Aldy, Faculty Affiliate, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

"...GAO was asked to elicit the opinions of experts on (1) actions the Congress might consider to address climate change and what is known about the potential benefits, costs, and uncertainties of these actions and (2) the key strengths and limitations of policies or actions to address climate change. GAO worked with the National Academy of Sciences to identify a panel of noted economists with expertise in analyzing the economic impacts of climate change policies and gathered their opinions through iterative, Web-based questionnaires. The findings reported here represent the views of the 18 economists who responded to both questionnaires."

Two of the 18 economists who participated were Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements Co-Directors Joseph Aldy and Robert Stavins. In addition, two other participating economists, James Edmonds of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and William Pizer of Resources for the Future, are members of Harvard Project research teams.

May 7, 2008

"Economic Incentives in a New Climate Agreement"

Paper

By Joseph E. Aldy, Faculty Affiliate, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements has agreed to help the Office of the Danish Prime Minister, in its role as incoming President of the 2009 Conference of the Parties, to prepare background papers and on-site briefings for a series of very high-level dialogues on climate change policy, hosted by the Prime Minister. These dialogues will each include about 25 participants, including CEOs of European and U.S. corporations, key officials from national governments and intergovernmental organizations, and leaders of major environmental NGOs. This paper on the subject of economic incentives was prepared by the Harvard Project leadership for the first dialogue.

May / June 2008

"Climate Policy Architectures for the Post-Kyoto World"

Journal Article, Environment, issue 3, volume 50

By Joseph E. Aldy, Faculty Affiliate, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

"The global climate has changed and will continue to change as a result of greenhouse gas emissions from a broad variety of human activities. In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change determined that 'most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.' If greenhouse gas emissions continue to grow unabated, the global average temperature will likely increase between 1.1°C and 6.4°C. This warming will unleash a myriad of impacts, the vast majority of which will adversely affect water availability, agricultural and forestry productivity, the spread of infectious diseases, extreme weather events, unique ecosystems and rare species, and the built environment in coastal areas. The risks of global climate change clearly necessitate an international effort."

April 14, 2008

"Addressing Global Climate Change with a Comprehensive U.S. Cap-and-Trade System"

Discussion Paper

By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

There is a growing impetus for a domestic U.S. climate policy that can provide meaningful reductions in emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. The paper describes and analyzes an up-stream, economy-wide CO2 cap-and-trade system which implements a gradual trajectory of emissions reductions (with inclusion over time of non-CO2 greenhouse gases), and includes mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty.

March 16, 2008

"State Fight Against Climate Change Benefits Everyone"

Op-Ed, Sacramento Bee

By Lawrence Goulder and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

"Because a cap-and-trade system would reduce California's overall greenhouse gas emissions, it would also lower the state's emissions of the co-pollutants. Still, it's possible, though unlikely, that co-pollutant emissions would increase in a particular locality. But here it's crucial to recognize that existing air pollution laws address such pollutants, and so any greenhouse gas allowance trades that would violate local air pollution limits would be prohibited."

January 24, 2008

"A Sensible and Practical Way to Cut U.S. CO2 Emissions"

Op-Ed

By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

There is growing impetus for a domestic U.S. climate policy that can provide meaningful reductions in emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. It is important to identify the best policy instruments at the outset, because once a policy architecture is put in place, it can be very difficult to make a change. A poorly designed policy could impose unnecessarily high costs while providing little public benefit, and could detract from the development of a more effective, long-run policy.