Robert N. Stavins
Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
Director, Harvard Environmental Economics Program
Chair, Environment and Natural Resources Faculty Group
Chairman, Ph.D. Programs in Public Policy and Political Economy & Government
Co-Chair, Kennedy School-Harvard Business School Joint Degree Programs
Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Contact:
Telephone: (617) 495-1820
Fax: (617) 496-3783
Email: robert_stavins@harvard.edu
Website: http://www.stavins.com
Publications: http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~rstavins/cvweb.html
"Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global Problem?"
Discussion Paper
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
There continues to be a great debate about the desirability of taking actions to limit carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas emissions, but it is important to consider policy instruments that can be employed to meet targets that may eventually be forthcoming. The theoretical advantages of market-based instruments,, such as carbon taxes and systems of tradable carbon rights, are striking In the U.S. domestic context, grandfathered tradable permits will probably be the preferred approach (if any) in the short run, although revenue-neutral carbon taxes will hold greater promise in the long run. In the international context, a system of international tradable permits could provide important advantages over alternative approaches, but it is difficult to imagine what existing international institution could adminster such a system. Hence, despite the great theoretical advantages of market-based approaches to addressing global climate change, neither domestic political barriers nor international institutional impediments to implementing these and other instruments should underestimated.
"Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Regulation"
Discussion Paper
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
In the realm of environmental policy instrument choice, there is great divergence between the recommendations of normative economic theory and positive political reality. Four gaps stand out. First, despite the advantages of market-based policy instruments, they have been used to a minor degree, compared with conventional, command-and-control instruments. Second, pollution-control standards have typically been much more stringent for new than for existing sources, despite the inefficiency of this approach. Third, in the few instances in which market-based instruments have been adopted, they have nearly always taken the form of grandfathered tradeable permits, rather than auctioned permits or pollution taxes, despite the advantages in some situations of these other instruments. Fourth, the political attention given to market-based environmental policy instruments has increased dramatically in recent years. We search for explanations for these four apparent anomalies by drawing upon intellectual traditions from economics, political science, and law.
"Incentives Based Environment Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?"
Discussion Paper
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
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"Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change"
Discussion Paper
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
Concerns about global climate change linked with the combustion of fossil fuels has produced considerable interest in the potential for public policies to reduce energy consumption.
"Readings in the Field of Natural Resource and Environmental Economics"
Discussion Paper
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
This is the latest version of a document periodically produced sine the early 1980s. It combines an outline of the field of natural rseouce and enviornmental economics with a bibliography of 945 references. In the past, this reading list has been used in a variety of ways: as a guide to the literature for graduate students in departments of economics which do not offer a Ph.D.-level survey course of the field; as a resource for Ph.D. students who wish to devleop a directed readings course in theild; and as an aid to students at the amsters and undergraduate levels who wish to explore selected areas in greater depth.
"What has Kyoto Wrought? The Real Architecture of International Tradeable Permits"
Discussion Paper
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and Robert W. Hahn
The authors investigate a central issue in the climate change debate associated with the Kyoto Protocol: the likely performance of international greenhouse gas trading mechanisms. Virtually all design studies and many projections of the costs of meeting the Kyoto targets have assumed that an international trading program can be established that minimizes the costs of meeting overall goals. This conclusion rests on several simplifying assumptions. The authors focus on one important issue that has received little, if any, attention: the interation between an international trading regime and a heterogeneous set of domestic greenhouse policy instruments. This is an important issue because the Protocol explicitly provides for domestic sovereignty reagrding instrument choice, and because it is unlikely that most countries will choose tradeable permits as their primary domestic vehicle.
"Environmental Policy in Transition Economy: Designing Tradable Permits for Poland"
Discussion Paper
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
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"Energy-Efficient Technologies and Climate Change Policies: Issues and Evidence"
Discussion Paper
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
Enhanced energy efficiency occupies a central role in evaluating the efficacy and cost of climate change policies. Ultimately, total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are the product of population, economic activity per capita, energy use per unit of economic activity, and the carbon intensity of energy used. Although greenhouse gas emissions can be limited by reducing economic activity, this option obviously has little appeal even to rich countries, let alone poor ones. Much attention has therefore been placed on the role that technological improvements can play in reducing carbon emissions and in lowering the cost of those reductions. In addition, the influence of technological changes on the emission, concentration, and cost of reducing GHGs will tend to overwhelm other factors, especially in the longer term. Understanding the process of technological change is therefore of utmost importance. Nonetheless, the task of measuring, modeling, and ultimately influencing the path of technological development is fraught with complexity and uncertainty - as are the technologies themselves.
"Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments"
Discussion Paper
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
Environmental policies typically combine the identification of a goal with some means to achieve that goal. This paper, prepared as a chapter draft of the forthcoming Handbook of Environmental Economics, focuses exclusively on the second component, the means -- the "instruments" -- of environmental policy, and considers, in particular, experience around the world with the relatively new breed of economic-incentive or market-based policy instrumens. The author defines these instruments broadly, and considers them within four categories: pollution charges, tradable permits; market barrier reductions; and government subsidy reductions. By defining market-based instruments broadly, the author casts a large net for this review of applications. As a consequence, the review is extensvie. But this should not leave the impression that market-baseed instruments have replaced, or have come anywhere close to replacing, the conventional, command-and-control approach to environmental protection. Further, even when and where these approaches have been used in their purest form and with some success, such as in the case of tradeable permit systems int he United States, they have not always performed as anticipated. In the final part of the paper, the author asks what lessons can be learned from our experiences. In particular, the paper considers normative lessons for: design and implementation; analysis of prospective and adopted systems; and identification of new applications.
