Robert N. Stavins
Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
Director, Harvard Environmental Economics Program
Chair, Environment and Natural Resources Faculty Group
Chairman, Ph.D. Programs in Public Policy and Political Economy & Government
Co-Chair, Kennedy School-Harvard Business School Joint Degree Programs
Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Contact:
Telephone: (617) 495-1820
Fax: (617) 496-3783
Email: robert_stavins@harvard.edu
Website: http://www.stavins.com
Publications: http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~rstavins/cvweb.html
AP Photo/John Giles
July 2012
"Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems"
Discussion Paper
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and Matthew Ranson
The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. This paper addresses an important component of potential climate policy architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases.
AP Photo
December 6, 2010
"Will We Know Success When We See It?"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, National Journal
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
"It might be relatively easy, but actually quite unfortunate, for countries to achieve what some people might define as 'success' in Cancun: a signed international agreement, followed by glowing press releases. I say it would unfortunate, because such an agreement could only be the Kyoto Protocol on steroids: more stringent targets for the original list of industrialized countries (Annex I) and no meaningful commitments by the key rapidly-growing emerging economies, such as China, India, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and South Africa."
AP Photo
December 6, 2010
"Will We Know Success When We See It?"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, National Journal
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
"It might be relatively easy, but actually quite unfortunate, for countries to achieve what some people might define as 'success' in Cancun: a signed international agreement, followed by glowing press releases. I say it would unfortunate, because such an agreement could only be the Kyoto Protocol on steroids: more stringent targets for the original list of industrialized countries (Annex I) and no meaningful commitments by the key rapidly-growing emerging economies, such as China, India, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and South Africa."
March 7, 2013
"The Sordid History of Congressional Acceptance and Rejection of Cap-and-Trade: Implications for Climate Policy"
Op-Ed, Vox
By Richard Schmalensee and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
Not so long ago, cap-and-trade mechanisms for environmental protection were popular in Congress. Now, such mechanisms are denigrated. What happened? This column tells the sordid tale of how conservatives in Congress who once supported cap and trade now lambast climate change legislation as 'cap-and-tax'. Ironically, conservatives are choosing to demonise their own market-based creation. The successful conservative campaign that disparaged cap-and-trade means it may now be politically impossible to promote it in the US. The good news? Elsewhere, cap and trade is now a proven, viable option for tackling large-scale environmental problems.
March 1, 2013
"Is Obama's Climate Change Policy Doomed to Fail? Maybe Not"
Op-Ed, PBS NEWSHOUR
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
"...[T]here will be actions having significant implications for U.S. CO2 emissions. The big difference is that most will not be called 'climate policy' and virtually all will be within the regulatory and executive-order domain, not new legislation. Will this set of actions and developments put the U.S. on a path to the long-term Waxman-Markey target of an 83 percent reduction below 2005 by 2050? Of course not. For that, a meaningful legislated, economy-wide, national carbon pricing regime will be necessary."
August 2012
"The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment"
Discussion Paper
By Richard Schmalensee and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
In a new discussion paper, authors Richard Schmalensee, professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Robert N. Stavins, director of the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, explore four ironic outcomes associated with the otherwise very successful sulfur-dioxide cap-and-trade system created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
AP Photo/John Giles
July 2012
"Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems"
Discussion Paper
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and Matthew Ranson
The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global CO2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. This paper addresses an important component of potential climate policy architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases.
AP Photo
June 26, 2012
"Don't Write Off Cap and Trade"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, China Dialogue
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
Various journalists and advocates have, of late, described America's Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) as being near "the brink of failure" thanks to the trend of very low prices of permits to emit carbon dioxide. Likewise, commentators have claimed that Europe's carbon market, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), may be "sinking into oblivion" because its emissions allowances too have become very cheap.
AP Photo
January 2012
The SO2 Allowance Trading System and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Reflections on Twenty Years of Policy Innovation
Report
By Gabe Chan, Research Fellow, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group, Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, Robert C. Stowe, Executive Director, Harvard Environmental Economics Program; Manager, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and Richard Sweeney
The introduction of the U.S. SO2 allowance-trading program to address the threat of acid rain as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 is a landmark event in the history of environmental regulation. The program was a great success by almost all measures. Ironically, cap and trade seems especially well suited to addressing the problem of climate change, in that emitted greenhouse gases are evenly distributed throughout the world's atmosphere. Recent hostility toward cap and trade in debates about U.S. climate legislation may reflect the broader political environment of the climate debate more than the substantive merits of market-based regulation.
December 5, 2011
"A Wave of the Future: International Linkage of Carbon Markets"
Op-Ed, Outreach
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
"...[I]t remains true that cap-and-trade is still the most likely domestic policy approach for CO2 emissions reductions throughout the industrialised world, given the rather unattractive set of available alternative approaches. This makes it important to think about the possibility of linking these national and regional cap-and-trade systems in the future. Such linking occurs when the government that maintains one system allows regulated entities to use allowances or credits from other systems to meet compliance obligations."
