"Any international agreement to address climate change must rest on broad public support in developed nations for mitigation actions. We propose an international climate architecture that builds on such public support — which we hope will be forthcoming — and uses multilateral international institutions to extend its effects to countries without such "green" publics."
A successful climate change regime must secure sufficient participation, achieve agreement on meaningful rules, and establish mechanisms for compliance. Moreover, it must do so in a political environment of sovereign states with differing preferences and capabilities. Section I addresses the trade-off between participation and strictness of rules by proposing an "economy of esteem for climate change," in which participation is encouraged by a system of prizes for politicians who take leadership on this issue. The bulk of the paper focuses on compliance, arguing that contrary to current provisions in the Kyoto Protocol, only a system of buyer liability (rather than seller or hybrid liability) is consistent with existing political realities. Drawing analogies to international bond markets, we propose a system of buyer liability that would endogenously generate market arrangements, such as rating agencies and fluctuations in the price of emissions permits according to perceived risk. These features would in turn create incentives for compliance without resorting to ineffective inter-state punishments.