"China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 35
China exploded its first nuclear weapon in 1964. Yet for several decades, it did not increase the size of its arsenal, leaving itself vulnerable to a potential nuclear first strike by the United States or the Soviet Union. One explanation for this decision is that Chinese leaders viewed nuclear weapons primarily as a tool of deterrence. Another is that internal organizational and political factors constrained the development of a robust nuclear strategy. Today, although China has the capability to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal, its leadership has not changed China's nuclear policy, which remains the pursuit of a credible second-strike capability.
June 22 - July 1, 2008
Report of the Strategic Security Issues Delegation to Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC)
By Dr. William J. Perry, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Admiral (ret.) Joseph W. Prueher, Former Senior Advisor, Preventive Defense Project, Robert D. Blackwill, International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities, Stephen A. Orlins, Dr. David M. Lampton, Kurt M. Campbell, Former Associate Professor of Public Policy and International Relations, 1988-1993, Harvard Kennedy School; Former Assistant Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 1988-1993; and Former Research Fellow, ISP, 1985-1987, Dr. Ashley Tellis, Dr. Evan Medeiros and Jan Berris
Full text of the trip report from PDP's Track II meetings in Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC).