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Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer

Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer

Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

 

Experience

Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

Current Affiliation: Assistant Professor, Norwegian Defence University College

 

 

By Date

 

2011

AP Photo

October 2011

"Attacks on Nuclear Infrastructure: Opening Pandora's Box?"

Policy Brief

By Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

"Recent evidence confirms that the Osirak reactor was intended not to produce plutonium for a weapons program, but rather to develop know-how that would be necessary if Iraq acquired an unsafeguarded reactor better suited for large-scale production of plutonium. Israel's attack triggered a far more focused and determined Iraqi effort to acquire nuclear weapons."

 

 

AP Photo

Summer 2011

"Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks"

Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 36

By Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

Israeli’s attack on Iraq’s nearly operational Osirak reactor in 1981 may have caused immediate delays in Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, but ultimately it may have galvanized Iraq into revamping its nuclear program.  Prior to the attack, Iraq’s nuclear program was disorganized and inconsistently supported; it also lacked a steady budget.  Immediately after the attack, Iraq established a covert nuclear program aimed specifically at producing nuclear weapons.  Although preventative attacks can be affective in the short term, it is crucial to consider that such attacks may create a consensus among leaders about the need for nuclear weapons and therefore lead to an intensified nuclear program.

 

2010

AP Photo

May 11, 2010

"Can an Attack Deny Iran the Bomb?"

Op-Ed, The Huffington Post

By Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

"Advocates of the strike option suggest that the delay caused by an attack buys valuable time. This begs the question: time to do what? After an attack, three options remain: more strikes, containment or regime change. In the Iraqi case, between 1991 and 2003 air strikes were largely ineffectual, containment crumbled and regime change proved disastrous. Containment and further strikes are unlikely to dissuade a determined Iranian leadership from acquiring nuclear weapons. Regime change is no longer an option."

 

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