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Vipin Narang

Vipin Narang

Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

 

Experience

Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

Current Affiliation: Mitsui Career Development Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

 

 

By Date

 

2010

AP Photo

January 2010

"Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Implications for South Asian Stability"

Policy Brief

By Vipin Narang, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

"...[E]xtremist elements in Pakistan have a clear incentive to precipitate a crisis between India and Pakistan, so that Pakistan's nuclear assets become more exposed and vulnerable to theft. Terrorist organizations in the region with nuclear ambitions, such as al-Qaida, may find no easier route to obtaining fissile material or a fully functional nuclear weapon than to attack India, thereby triggering a crisis between India and Pakistan and forcing Pakistan to ready and disperse nuclear assets—with few, if any, negative controls—and then attempting to steal the nuclear material when it is being moved or in the field, where it is less secure than in peacetime locations."

 

 

AP Photo

Winter 2009/10

"Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability"

Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 34

By Vipin Narang, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

India and Pakistan are both nuclear-armed states, but their divergent nuclear postures have led to a stark difference in their deterrence capabilities. India has maintained an assured retaliation posture, but Pakistan has shifted from a catalytic to an asymmetric escalation posture, allowing it to pursue aggressive policies without significant fear of retaliation. Furthermore, to make its posture credible, Pakistan has had to relinquish some central control over the security of its nuclear arsenal. The implications for South Asian and international stability, therefore, are grim unless India and Pakistan can minimize the dangers of their current postures, and the United States can help Pakistan to better secure its nuclear arsenal.

 

2009

Susan Lynch/Belfer Center

Summer 2009

"Q&A with Vipin Narang"

Q&A

By Beth Maclin, Former Communications Assistant, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Vipin Narang, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

Vipin Narang, a research fellow with International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom, discusses nuclear security and terrorism.

 

 

Winter 2009-10

"Featured Fellows - Focus on Research"

Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter

By Sharon Wilke, Associate Director of Communications, Melissa Willard-Foster, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2012 and Vipin Narang, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

Melissa Willard-Foster discusses key components to a lasting peace agreement and Vipin Narang explains Taliban threat to Pakistan nuclear weapons. Willard-Foster is a research fellow with the Belfer Center's International Security Program (ISP) and Narang is a research fellow with the ISP and Project on Managing the Atom.

 

 

2009

"Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia"

Book Chapter

By Vipin Narang, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

Vipin Narang's chapter "Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia" in the book Inside Nuclear South Asia was published by Stanford University.  Narang examines the ballistic missile flight-testing pattern in the region as a proxy for nuclearization and as an indicator for both states' strategic weapons decisions, attempting to clarify the variables that drive both India and Pakistan to test strategic weapons when they do.

 

 

AP Photo

August 13, 2009

"Pakistan's Nukes are Safe. Maybe."

Op-Ed, Foreign Policy

By Vipin Narang, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010

"...[T]he primary risk to the Pakistani Army's ability to safely secure nuclear assets in its custody would likely be during crisis scenarios — either against India or due to a perceived Western threat to the integrity of Pakistan's arsenal — that might cause Pakistan to move to a higher state of nuclear readiness. If the Army feels compelled to rapidly disperse or relocate nuclear components and loses the defensive advantage of protecting them in secure fixed locations, insider foreknowledge of movements and the loss of centralized control could increase the probability of theft or loss...."

 

 

Spring 2009

"Who Are These Belligerent Democratizers? Reassessing the Impact of Democratization on War"

Journal Article, International Organization, issue 2, volume 63

By Vipin Narang, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010 and Rebecca M. Nelson

In a key finding in the democratic peace literature, Mansfield and Snyder argue that states with weak institutions undergoing incomplete transitions to democracy are more likely to initiate an external war than other types of states. We show that the empirical data do not support this claim. We find a dearth of observations where incomplete democratizers with weak institutions participated in war. Additionally, we find that the statistical relationship between incomplete democratization and war is entirely dependent on the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire prior to World War I. We also find that the case selection in Mansfield and Snyder rarely involved incomplete democratizers with weak institutions. We therefore conclude that the finding that incomplete democratizers with weak institutions are more likely to initiate or participate in war is not supported by the empirical data.

 
Events Calendar

We host a busy schedule of events throughout the fall, winter and spring. Past guests include: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, former Vice President Al Gore, and former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev.