Azeem Ibrahim
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2010
AP Photo
December 9, 2009
"Afghanistan's Way Forward Must Include the Taliban"
Op-Ed, Los Angeles Times
By Azeem Ibrahim, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2010
"President Obama, in spelling out the new U.S. strategy on Afghanistan this month, said that the United States will countenance dialogue with some elements of the Taliban....This is not as startling as it might seem, and it is vital to understand why it is so important. First, many Taliban fighters are simply peripheral Taliban militants. They joined the Taliban as a pragmatic opportunity for advancement in a country where most power comes from conservative Islam or guns. They typically fight close to the village where they live and grew up, and so lack the mobility of a true militia."
AP Photo
Summer 2009
"Testing the NATO Alliance: Afghanistan and the Future of Cooperation"
Op-Ed, Harvard International Review, issue 2, volume 31
By Azeem Ibrahim, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2010
"...[O]n the ground, Afghanistan does not look like a NATO mission, but a deployment of an ad hoc alliance. This impression is bolstered given that eight non-NATO countries are also contributing troops. This arrangement calls into question how genuine and useful the alliance will be in the future. It is no good to argue that NATO countries should share the burden more equally. That will not be enough to persuade skeptical governments to offer more troops. The truth is that the differences in deployment levels reflect real differences of public and political opinion. Unfortunately, there is no reason to expect that they should agree in the future either, as there is no longer agreement on what constitutes NATO's mission in Afghanistan."
AP Photo
September 2009
"The Next Government Must Fund Britain's Armed Forces to Match the Many and Growing Threats to National Security"
Policy Brief
By Azeem Ibrahim, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2010
"The choice facing the next Prime Minister and government is clear. On the one hand, he can continue the policy of the present Government. This will result in a slow slide down the second division of nations, an inability to defend the sea passages on which our global trade and standard of living depend (ninety per cent of our trade still comes by sea), an inability to secure our growing imported energy supplies and the vital food supplies which we in this country take for granted.
Or, the next Government can resist this decline, hold firm against the pressure to reduce defence funding, and provide an adequate defence provision with contingency reserve capability for all three Services. If this decision is made, it should be done as a deliberate and well researched policy."
AP Photo
July 10, 2009
"Politicians are Demolishing the Reputation of the British Military"
Op-Ed, politics.co.uk
By Azeem Ibrahim, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2010
"In 2006, British and Canadian forces arrived in Helmand province. We were to hold and secure it. But our forces did not receive the support they needed. Resources were split between Afghanistan and Iraq, and the government repeatedly turned down requests to spend more on equipment, particularly helicopters.
The results speak for themselves. Firstly, Taliban fighters have been able to tap into opium revenues. They have increased their areas of drug cultivation from 71 square milles in 2001 to 400 square miles in 2008. This would not have been possible if our strategy to make the area unsafe for Taliban had been adequately supported."
AP Photo
March 6, 2009
"Pakistan in Denial is its Biggest Security Obstacle"
Op-Ed, Middle East Times
By Azeem Ibrahim, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2010
"...[M]ost of the Pakistani elite are in denial. Too many authoritative figures simply refuse to face the extent to which the terrorist threat from Islamist radicals comes from within Pakistan....Many Pakistanis believe that America wants the destruction of Pakistan because it is the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons, and that it is trying to enlist Pakistani help in Afghanistan only in order to trap it in a pincer movement between India and American troops there."
AP Photo
January 21, 2009
"Obama's 'Troops in' Movement Will Not Force the Taleban Out"
Op-Ed, The Scotsman
By Azeem Ibrahim, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2010
"The bottom line is that our war aims can still be achieved, but not by force alone. Lasting stability in Afghanistan will only be achieved by negotiating with moderate elements in the Taleban and opening the way for them to share power. That will bolster the legitimacy of national government in Afghanistan, and ultimately divide and weaken the insurgents. Troops will be necessary to reduce the insurgency. But this should be seen as a means to the end of ending the conflict by enabling us to negotiate from a position of relative strength. Only a power-sharing government which includes the least extreme elements of the Taleban will be able to achieve the other three war aims — ensuring that Afghanistan remains a legitimate state, ensuring that it can handle its own security, and keeping core al Qaeda out of the country."
AP Photo
August 11, 2009
"How America Is Funding Corruption in Pakistan"
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Azeem Ibrahim, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2010
"For the last eight years, U.S. taxpayers' money has funded hardly any bona fide counterterrorism successes, but quite a bit of corruption in the Pakistani Army and intelligence services. The money has enriched individuals at the expense of the proper functioning of the country's institutions. It has provided habitual kleptocrats with further incentives to skim off the top. Despite the U.S. goal of encouraging democratization, assistance to Pakistan has actually weakened the country's civilian government. And perhaps worst of all, it has hindered Pakistan's ability to fight terrorists."
AP Photo
July 2009
"U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption"
Discussion Paper
By Azeem Ibrahim, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2010
The United States must not provide Pakistani institutions with incentives to act counter to U.S. foreign policy objectives in the future. It has done so in the past. But until the spring of 2009, no comprehensive overview of the full funding to Pakistan was possible as the figures were kept secret. Those figures, as well as a full analysis of what is known about how they were spent, can now be evaluated. The available information paints a picture of a systemic lack of supervision in the provision of aid to Pakistan, often lax U.S. oversight, and the incentivization of U.S. taxpayer–funded corruption in the Pakistani military and security services. The author believes that this is the first attempt to present an overview of U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2001, evaluate it, and present recommendations on how to ensure that mistakes are not repeated and lessons are learned.
AP Photo
March 6, 2009
"Pakistan in Denial is its Biggest Security Obstacle"
Op-Ed, Middle East Times
By Azeem Ibrahim, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2010
"...[M]ost of the Pakistani elite are in denial. Too many authoritative figures simply refuse to face the extent to which the terrorist threat from Islamist radicals comes from within Pakistan....Many Pakistanis believe that America wants the destruction of Pakistan because it is the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons, and that it is trying to enlist Pakistani help in Afghanistan only in order to trap it in a pincer movement between India and American troops there."
AP Photo
December 3, 2008
"Islamist Terrorism Goes Freelance"
Op-Ed, Chicago Tribune
By Azeem Ibrahim, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2010
"Intelligence services in the U.S., United Kingdom, Holland, Denmark and Sweden agree that the main threat now comes mainly from freelance cells. Islamist terrorism has changed and the atrocities in Mumbai show that failure to grasp that change is dangerous....Freelance radicals can move across borders easily, disband and regroup at will and can be coordinated remotely. Inspiration and know-how can be disseminated, and plans formed, online between radicals who need not even have met. But the crucial difference is that any given terrorist can be replaced with another. That means any terrorist group cannot be conclusively defeated. This fact calls for a change in how Western governments address terror."
