Norrin M. Ripsman
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, January–June 2011
Summer 2012
"Correspondence: Debating the Sources and Prospects of European Integration"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 37
By Ulrich Krotz, Richard Maher, David M. McCourt, Andrew Glencross, Norrin M. Ripsman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, January–June 2011, Mark Sheetz, Associate, International Security Program, Jean-Yves Haine and Sebastian Rosato, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2005–2006
Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, David M. McCourt and Andrew Glencross, Norrin M. Ripsman, Mark S. Sheetz and Jean-Yves Haine respond to Sebastian Rosato's spring 2011 article, "Europe’s Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project."
Summer 2009
"Correspondence: Debating British Decisionmaking toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 34
By Andrew Barros, Talbot C. Imlay, Evan Resnick, Norrin M. Ripsman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, January–June 2011 and Jack S. Levy
Andrew Barros, Talbot Imlay, and Evan Resnick reply to Norrin Ripsman and Jack Levy's Fall 2008 International Security article, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s."
Fall 2008
"Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 33
By Norrin M. Ripsman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, January–June 2011 and Jack S. Levy
British appeasement was primarily a strategy of buying time for rearmament against Germany. British leaders understood the Nazi menace and did not expect that appeasement would avoid an eventual war with Germany. They believed that by the time of the Rhineland crisis of 1936 the balance of power had already shifted in Germany’sfavor, but that British rearmament would work to reverse the balance by the end of the decade. Appeasement was a strategy to delay an expected confrontation with Germany until the military balance was more favorable.
