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Massimo Tavoni

 

 

By Date

 

2015

October 2015

"Regional Carbon Budgets: Do They Matter for Climate Policy?"

Discussion Paper

By Massimo Tavoni and Detlef P. van Vuuren

Carbon budgets have emerged as a robust metric of warming, but their application to climate policy has been limited to global assessments. This Discussion Paper explores the potential of regional carbon budgets to inform climate policy.

 

 

June 2015

"The Optimal Energy Mix in Power Generation and the Contribution from Natural Gas in Reducing Carbon Emissions to 2030 and Beyond—Summary"

Policy Brief

By Carlo Carraro, Massimo Tavoni, Thomas Longden and Giacomo Marangoni

This paper analyses a set of new scenarios for energy markets in Europe to evaluate the consistency of economic incentives and climate objectives. It focuses in particular on the role of natural gas across a range of climate policy scenarios (including the Copenhagen Pledges and the EU Roadmap) to identify whether current trend and policies are leading to an economically efficient and, at the same time, climate friendly, energy mix.

 

2014

January 2014

"The Optimal Energy Mix in Power Generation and the Contribution from Natural Gas in Reducing Carbon Emissions to 2030 and Beyond"

Discussion Paper

By Carlo Carraro, Massimo Tavoni, Thomas Longden and Giacomo Marangoni

The authors evaluate the consistency of economic incentives and climate objectives in Europe, with regard to energy markets. In this context, they examine policy interactions between the EU-ETS and Europe's renewable target—and the role of natural gas in a transition to a low-carbon economy.

 

2012

March 2012

"Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment"

Discussion Paper

By Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Enrica De Cian, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni

"A successful international climate policy framework will have to meet two conditions, build a coalition of countries that is potentially effective and give each member country sufficient incentives to join and remain in this coalition. Such coalition should be capable of delivering ambitious emission reduction even if some countries do not take mitigation action. In addition, it should meet the target without exceedingly high mitigation costs and deliver a net benefit to member countries as a whole. The novel contribution of this paper is mostly methodological, but it also adds a better qualification of well-known results that are policy relevant."

 

2009

AP Photo

July 6, 2009

"Sharing Global CO2 Emission Reductions Among One Billion High Emitters"

Journal Article, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

By Shoibal Chakravarty, Ananth Chikkatur, Former Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group, Heleen de Coninck, Stephen Pacala, Robert Socolow and Massimo Tavoni

The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) created a 2-tier world. It called upon the developed ("Annex I") countries to "take the lead" in reducing carbon emissions, and, under the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities," established no time frame for developing countries to follow. However, a consensus is now emerging in favor of low stabilization targets. These targets cannot be achieved without the participation of developing countries, which today emit about half of global CO2 emissions and whose future emissions increase faster than the emissions of industrialized countries under "business as usual" scenarios.

 

2008

December 2008

"Modeling Economic Impacts of Alternative International Climate Policy Architectures: A Quantitative and Comparative Assessment of Architectures for Agreement—Summary"

Policy Brief

By Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Alessandra Sgobbi and Massimo Tavoni

With broad recognition that a coordinated global effort is needed to address climate change, negotiations are already underway to define a new international climate agreement. Various architectures for such an agreement have been proposed. This paper undertakes a first-of-its-kind comparison of some prominent options using a common framework to assess four features of these architectures: economic efficiency; environmental effectiveness; distributional implications; and political acceptability, as measured in terms of feasibility and enforceability. The aim is to derive useful policy insights for designing a post-Kyoto agreement.

 

 

December 2008

"Modeling Economic Impacts of Alternative International Climate Policy Architectures: A Quantitative and Comparative Assessment of Architectures for Agreement"

Discussion Paper

By Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Alessandra Sgobbi and Massimo Tavoni

This paper provides a quantitative comparison of the main architectures for an agreement on climate policy. Possible successors to the Kyoto protocol are assessed according to four criteria: economic efficiency; environmental effectiveness; distributional implications; and their political acceptability which is measured in terms of feasibility and enforceability. The ultimate aim is to derive useful information for designing a future agreement on climate change control.

 

 

October 7, 2008

"Equity and Climate Policy: An Allocation Method Based on Individual Emissions"

Presentation

By Shoibal Chakravarty, Ananth Chikkatur, Former Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group and Massimo Tavoni

The speakers presented a new framework for allocation of a global carbon reduction target among nations, in which "common but differentiated responsibilities" refers to the emissions of individuals, rather than of nations.

 
Events Calendar

We host a busy schedule of events throughout the fall, winter and spring. Past guests include: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, former Vice President Al Gore, and former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev.