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William H. Tobey
Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Contact:
Telephone: 617-496-0518
Fax: 617-495-8963
Email: william_tobey@hks.harvard.edu
April 4-5, 2011
The Non-State Actor Nuclear Supply Chain
Presentation
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
William H. Tobey, and Matthew Bunn presented "The Non-State Actor Nuclear Supply Chain" at the Workshop on “Cooperation to Control Non-State Nuclear Proliferation: Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction and UN Resolutions 1540 and 1373” sponsored by the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability on April 4 and 5, 2011.
June 11, 2012
"The Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism"
Testimony
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Simon Saradzhyan, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
On June 11, 2012, the Belfer Center's William Tobey, Matthew Bunn and Simon Saradzhyan testified before Canada's upper house of parliament, the Senate, on the threat of nuclear terrorism and strategies to combat it.
January/ February 2012
"Nuclear Scientists as Assassination Targets"
Journal Article, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, issue 1, volume 68
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Since 2007, international media have reported the violent deaths of four scientists and engineers connected with Iran’s nuclear program and an attempt on the life of a fifth. The news reports on such killings are murky, incomplete, and, in some instances, likely inaccurate...
May 2011
Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options
Report
By Fred McGoldrick, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom and William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Fred McGoldrick authored a report, entitled "Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options" that provides an informed analysis and set of recommendations on how to strengthen restraints on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies in a manner that would be acceptable to all Nuclear Suppliers Group members, and would be credible to the major exporting states and industry.
April 4-5, 2011
The Non-State Actor Nuclear Supply Chain
Presentation
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
William H. Tobey, and Matthew Bunn presented "The Non-State Actor Nuclear Supply Chain" at the Workshop on “Cooperation to Control Non-State Nuclear Proliferation: Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction and UN Resolutions 1540 and 1373” sponsored by the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability on April 4 and 5, 2011.
March 3, 2011
"Keep Up the Pace of Locking Down the Bomb"
Op-Ed, The Huffington Post
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"The WikiLeaks cables reveal an episode in which officials in Yemen — home of al Qaeda's most active regional branch — warned that a deadly radioactive source was sitting in building whose only guard had left and whose sole security camera had long been broken. These programs provide the practical means to deal with such threats."
November 24, 2010
"Why We're Always Fooled by North Korea"
Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"This nuclear revelation is not an intelligence failure. Over the past decade, intelligence analysts have consistently predicted North Korea's path to nuclear weapons and noted the increasing evidence of its missile and nuclear proliferation. The failure has been that of policy makers and pundits who denigrated the analysis, ignored it, or clung to the fallacy that North Korea would abide by a denuclearization deal."
November 23, 2010
"Peninsula of Fear"
Op-Ed, City Journal
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"The Yongbyon revelations have prompted intense debate within policy circles about North Korea's capabilities and intentions-for instance, about whether North Korea was able to build the new enrichment facility without foreign help and about what it intends to do with this plant and more broadly, with its nuclear program. Some hope that Pyongyang wants to use the facility as a bargaining chip and that it may scale back its program to get sanctions lifted and secure normal relations with the U.S. and other nations. But more officials take the pessimistic view that Pyongyang unveiled the new facility to persuade Washington and its allies to accept North Korea as a member of the nuclear-weapons club."
September 9, 2010
"Avoiding a lose-lose situation with Iran"
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"The latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran's nuclear program is circulating in Vienna among governments, but has not yet been released officially. While couched in the calm tones of international civil servants, the report's message is unmistakable: Iran continues its steady march towards nuclear weapon capabilities, and no recent progress has been made in halting it."
July 26, 2010
"The Armageddon Test: To Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, Follow the Uranium"
Op-Ed, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"While the total amount of material that has been recovered and publicly disclosed is not sufficient to make a nuclear weapon, the matter is deadly serious. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, none of the recovered nuclear material was reported missing by its owners. Incredibly, none of these cases has been sufficiently investigated to determine the origin, destination, and all those responsible for the theft of the material."



