Patrick B. Johnston
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 20102011: International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 20092010
Spring 2012
"Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 36, volume 47-79
By Patrick B. Johnston, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 20102011: International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 20092010
A recent, data-driven study suggests that leadership targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns is a surprisingly effective tactic. Successful leadership decapitation can decrease campaign length, improve campaign success rate, and lessen the intensity of conflict and the number of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that possible negative effects, such as the "martyrdom effect" and decentralization, outweigh the benefits of successful decapitation. Although leadership decapitation is not a silver bullet, it is an effective technique that should be considered carefully in counterinsurgency strategy.
Spring 2012
"Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 36, volume 47-79
By Patrick B. Johnston, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 20102011: International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 20092010
A recent, data-driven study suggests that leadership targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns is a surprisingly effective tactic. Successful leadership decapitation can decrease campaign length, improve campaign success rate, and lessen the intensity of conflict and the number of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that possible negative effects, such as the "martyrdom effect" and decentralization, outweigh the benefits of successful decapitation. Although leadership decapitation is not a silver bullet, it is an effective technique that should be considered carefully in counterinsurgency strategy.
November 2010
"Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict"
Discussion Paper
By Benjamin Crost and Patrick B. Johnston, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 20102011: International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 20092010
An increasing amount of development aid is targeted to areas affected by civil conflict; some of it in the hope that aid will reduce conflict by weakening popular support for insurgent movements. But if insurgents know that development projects will weaken their position, they have an incentive to derail them, which may exacerbate conflict.
November 2010
"Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict"
Discussion Paper
By Benjamin Crost and Patrick B. Johnston, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 20102011: International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 20092010
An increasing amount of development aid is targeted to areas affected by civil conflict; some of it in the hope that aid will reduce conflict by weakening popular support for insurgent movements. But if insurgents know that development projects will weaken their position, they have an incentive to derail them, which may exacerbate conflict.
