Philipp C. Bleek
Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2009–December 2010
2010
"Why Do States Proliferate? Quantitative Analysis of the Exploration, Pursuit, and Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons"
Book Chapter
By Philipp C. Bleek, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2009–December 2010
"In Chapter 8, Philipp Bleek, like Muller and Schmidt, regards quantitative analysis as a valuable tool for understanding why states proliferate. More so than his German colleagues, he also makes the case for employing quantitative analyses explicitly for forecasting purposes...."
May 12, 2010
"Maybe Iran Isn't the Domino So Many Think It to Be"
Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal
By Philipp C. Bleek, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2009–December 2010
"...John Bolton repeats the conventional wisdom that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, or at least a weapons option, will prompt Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and perhaps others to "surely seek, and very swiftly, their own nuclear weapons." These concerns are widely shared across the political spectrum, but they have little basis in either historical experience or analysis of the specific countries alleged to be on the cusp of launching their own nuclear weapons programs."
May 1, 2005
"Nuclear 9/11: What if Port is Ground Zero?"
Op-Ed, The Houston Chronicle
By Philipp C. Bleek, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2009–December 2010, Anders Corr and Micah Zenko, Former Research Assistant to Graham Allison, 2003–2006; Former Research Associate, Project on Managing The Atom, 2006–2008
Anticipate the worst by shoring up reserves for insurance losses.
September 2004
"Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat"
Paper
By Philipp C. Bleek, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2009–December 2010
Nuclear proliferation to terrorists willing to sacrifice their lives to kill hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians represents a grave threat to the United States and its allies; nuclear proliferation to hostile states poses serious dangers. Yet poorly secured civil research sites with hundreds of nuclear bombs' worth of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium are scattered around the globe. Because obtaining such material is the greatest hurdle to constructing a nuclear weapon, these sites represent an urgent proliferation threat.
