Belfer Center Home > People > Olli Heinonen

« Back to Olli Heinonen

Olli Heinonen

Olli Heinonen

Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Contact:
Email: olli_heinonen@hks.harvard.edu

 

 

By Publication Type

 

Summer 2011

"After Fukushima: How Should Nuclear Regulators Respond?"

Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter

By Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

With the nuclear crisis at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi reactor continuing more than a month after the initial damage and radiation leaks, several Center experts responded to the question of what actions should be taken now by nuclear regulators around the world.

 

August 3, 2015

"The nuclear club: Old weapons die hard as new ones are born"

Op-Ed, Washington Examiner

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Two flashes, one in Hiroshima and the other in Nagasaki, extinguished the lives of 200,000 people, made equally large by the amount of suffering resulting from the consequences that the blast and radiation generated. This was also the start of the nuclear armament race, first between the United States and the then-Soviet Union, soon followed by the United Kingdom, France and China.

The two Cold War adversaries and environment the Cold War generated held the nuclear aspirations of the allies at bay. The warning by President Kennedy of a nightmare scenario of several dozen states gaining nuclear weapons in the coming age unless steps were taken did not materialize. Security guarantees by the U.S. and Soviet Union to their allies, access to peaceful nuclear technology and the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968 were medicines to curb nuclear proliferation.

 

 

AP

June 24, 2015

"Verifying a Final Nuclear Deal with Iran"

Op-Ed

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Unfettered access to sites, facilities, material, equipment, people, and documents is imperative to the credible long-term verification of any nuclear agreement with Iran. This “anywhere, anytime” access and short notice inspections must not be subject to a dispute resolution mechanism, which would delay the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) access.

 

 

AP

June 17, 2015

"How to Make Sure Iran's One-Year Nuclear Breakout Time Does Not Shrink"

Op-Ed

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Simon Henderson

The final deal needs to specify the total enrichment capacity of Iran's installed centrifuges, mandate a robust verification regime, and include other restrictions to the nuclear program's size and content.

 

 

AP

April 2, 2015

"We’ve reached a ‘nuclear framework’ with Iran. So now what?"

Op-Ed, Washington Post

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Seven experts weigh in on the agreement's implications.

 

 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy

March 28, 2015

"Iran's Nuclear Breakout Time: A Fact Sheet"

Op-Ed, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

With reports that Washington and its partners may reach a nuclear accord with Iran in the coming days, a former senior IAEA safeguards official answers the most pressing questions about Tehran's program and how the agreement might affect its capabilities.

 

 

ASSOCIATED PRESS

March 2015

"Verifying Iran for the Longer Term"

Op-Ed

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

P5+1 negotiators are reportedly nearing an agreement with Iran that would dismantle some elements of Iran’s nuclear program while only providing limits on all other parts of the program. It also would maintain meaningful parameters that assure—at a minimum—a one-year breakout capability. The Iran Task Force has raised concerns about numerous aspects of the current trajectory of negotiations and the P5+1’s concessions to Iran throughout the negotiations. The following memo addresses one such area of concern, namely the “sunset” of enhanced verification requirements.

 

 

AP Photo/Brian Snyder, Pool

March 22, 2015

"The Iran Time Bomb"

Op-Ed, Washington Post

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Michael Hayden and Ray Takeyh

As negotiations between Iran and the great powers press forward, Secretary of State John F. Kerry seems to have settled on this defense of any agreement: The terms will leave Iran at least a year away from obtaining a nuclear bomb, thus giving the world plenty of time to react to infractions. The argument is meant to reassure, particularly when a sizable enrichment capacity and a sunset clause appear to have already been conceded. A careful assessment, however, reveals that a one-year breakout time may not be sufficient to detect and reverse Iranian violations.

 

 

AP

October 2014

"Key Limitations on Iran’s Uranium Enrichment Program"

Op-Ed

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

In the preamble of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), the P5+1 concurred that a comprehensive agreement would involve an Iranian domestic enrichment capability. This concession, immediately pocketed by Tehran, marked a fundamental change in the negotiations. Instead of a complete suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities, as called for in multiple Security Council resolutions and a foundational plank of all previous negotiating positions, the P5+1 negotiators are now attempting to reach a comprehensive agreement with Iran that will establish a credible “threshold time window,” or “breakout time,” which would provide sufficient time to detect breakout and give the international community adequate time to respond to Iranian violations.

 

 

AP Photo/Joe Klamar, Pool

February 2015

"Changing the Operating Parameters of Centrifuges is NOT a Credible Solution to Gain Time"

Op-Ed

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

The following memo addresses one proposal mentioned in recent press reporting on the negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran. The result of such proposals recognizes Iran as a nuclear threshold state, which status the Task Force rejects.

 
Events Calendar

We host a busy schedule of events throughout the fall, winter and spring. Past guests include: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, former Vice President Al Gore, and former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev.