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Olli Heinonen

Olli Heinonen

Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

Contact:
Email: olli_heinonen@hks.harvard.edu

 

 

By Publication Type

 

AP

March 2016

"A New Nuclear World Order: Safety, Security and Safeguards"

Book Chapter

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

“A New Nuclear World Order: Safety, Security and Safeguards” in Die Zwischengesellschaft, written by Senior Fellow Olli Heinonen, reviews in detail measures to strengthen nuclear safety, security and safeguards to support states in developing and using nuclear energy in a safe, secure and peaceful manner.

 

 

June 2014

"International Atomic Energy Agency Inspections in Perspective"

Book Chapter

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

The nuclear nonproliferation regime continues to face a broad array of challenges. It is easy to see why new solutions are needed. The world is undergoing rapid changes on many fronts—including technologically. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force 40 years ago. It should not surprise us that the solutions of 1970 are not a perfect fit to the challenges of the 21st century.

 

 

Mark Holtzhausen

March 2014

"Verifying the Dismantlement of South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program"

Book Chapter

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

"In its 2010 annual Safeguards Statement [...] the IAEA determined that it 'found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.' This rolling safeguards report that provided a yearly review of the status of IAEA member states’ nuclear activities was noteworthy as South Africa was, for the first time, included in the above group of states."

 

 

Published by Springer

April 2, 2013

Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea: Foreword

Book Chapter

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

During the last two decades, there have been successes but also disappointments in fighting against nuclear proliferation. On the positive side, we witnessed the dismantlement of nuclear weapons programs in South Africa, Iraq, and Libya.

 

 

May 22, 2012

"The Verification of the Peaceful Nature of Iran's Nuclear Program"

Book Chapter

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

In this chapter, Olli Heinonen examines a decade of actions taken by Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Heinonen suggests a number of measures Iran might take to provide assurance to the international community that it is not developing nuclear weapons.  He writes: In tandem with the continued search for a negotiated political solution between the P5+1 and Iran, the IAEA should continue to press for commitments that would provide the best assurances on that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful. This means that the verification process will have to be comprehensive and expansive. What this also means is that the current stage of unsatisfactory cooperation and approach by Iran to the IAEA needs to change. Given the past experiences, if Iran takes the opportunity of widening those with the following measures, the IAEA will be in a position to provide assurances about the scope of Iran’s nuclear program.

 

IAEA

July 12, 2013

"IAEA Safeguards - Evolving to Meet Today’s Verification Undertakings"

Conference Paper

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

The 45-year-old NPT anchors states’ commitment to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy to nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s 40-year-old Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) premises its verification standard on the early detection of diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or purposes unknown.  The Agency’s mission in ensuring that nuclear uses remain solely peaceful has been challenged and remains the case in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. There are lessons to be drawn from the IAEA’s inspection process concerning these countries, and in that context, future adjustments of safeguards methods to consider.

 

 

AP Images

January 22, 2013

"The Middle Eastern Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ)- Nuclear Verification"

Conference Paper

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project and Christian Charlier

The establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East is a real challenge for the international community taking into consideration the absence of favorable conditions such as the mutual states recognitions as political entities with established diplomatic relations, and stability. To start with, there is no one single model for existing Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). Each existing NWFZ treaty had introduced elements, including creative legal arrangements, and unique features depending on the specificities of each zone. The current treaties of the South Pacific NWFZ, the Southeast Asian NWFZ, the African NWFZ, the Latin American NWFZ, and the Central Asian NWFZ, can be studied and applied where relevant. So, too, there exist organizations responsible for the verification of these treaties (IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO). The case of the Middle East will be more complex since the treaty is envisioned to cover all weapons of mass destruction including biological and chemical as well as their delivery vehicles. A large number of political, historical, technical, and verification issues need to be factored into the Treaty. In other words, working on a WMDFZ means the necessity to deal with all WMD aspects together. Progressing the WMDFZ further means looking at a composite picture of states’ concerns and relations in the region that just counting weapons reduction alone.

 

 

July 16, 2012

"The Middle Eastern Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) – Nuclear Verification"

Conference Paper

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

This publication is based on a presentation at the “Verification in the 21st Century – Technological, Political and Institutional Challenges and Opportunities”, 17 – 20 June 2012, Wilton Park, UK.

 

AP

December 18, 2015

"Evolving International Nuclear Safeguards"

Event Summary

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

Olli Heinonen led a seminar at the Argonne National Laboratory on the International Atomic Engergy Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards on December 18th as part of the Physics Division Colloquium Series.

 

Wikimedia

September 8, 2016

"Lessons learned from dismantlement of South Africa's biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs"

Journal Article, Nonproliferation Review

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

South Africa had active nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs during the 1970s and 1980s. South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapon program prior to its 1991 accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Similarly, it terminated its chemical weapons program prior to its 1995 ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Only the dismantlement of Pretoria's nuclear weapons program was subjected to international verification—albeit ex post facto—following a 1993 decision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference to verify the correctness and completeness of South Africa's declarations under its NPT safeguards agreement. During the 1980s, South Africa also developed and purportedly used biological weapons, violating its obligations under the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, which it had ratified in 1975. This article draws lessons from the verification of the dismantlement of these programs and makes recommendations for future verification work to confirm the elimination of weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

 
Events Calendar

We host a busy schedule of events throughout the fall, winter and spring. Past guests include: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, former Vice President Al Gore, and former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev.