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Olli Heinonen

Olli Heinonen

Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

Contact:
Email: olli_heinonen@hks.harvard.edu

 

 

By Program/Project

 

International Security

U.S. Dept. of State

Sunday, September 18, 2016

"Don’t Rely on Iran’s Good Intentions"

Op-Ed, The Cipher Brief

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

The international community cannot rely on Iran’s good intentions. It must build robust long-term assurances into all nuclear contracts that any separation of plutonium from spent fuel requires prior consent from the technology provider. Moreover, if necessary, the provider can request that the items in question be returned from the Islamic Republic.

 

 

Roman Harak

Friday, September 16, 2016

"North Korea’s 5th Nuclear Test – What now?"

Policy Brief, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

North Korea just heralded the 68th anniversary of its founding by conducting its fifth nuclear test. The initial seismic recordings were larger than previously recorded activity. This, coupled with other indicators, suggests that Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons capability is accelerating.

 

 

Wikimedia

September 8, 2016

"Lessons learned from dismantlement of South Africa's biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs"

Journal Article, Nonproliferation Review

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

South Africa had active nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs during the 1970s and 1980s. South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapon program prior to its 1991 accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Similarly, it terminated its chemical weapons program prior to its 1995 ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Only the dismantlement of Pretoria's nuclear weapons program was subjected to international verification—albeit ex post facto—following a 1993 decision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference to verify the correctness and completeness of South Africa's declarations under its NPT safeguards agreement. During the 1980s, South Africa also developed and purportedly used biological weapons, violating its obligations under the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, which it had ratified in 1975. This article draws lessons from the verification of the dismantlement of these programs and makes recommendations for future verification work to confirm the elimination of weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

 

 

Flickr

July 29, 2016

"Iran’s Breakout Time Drops Below Administration Benchmarks"

Policy Brief

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

Iran plans to manufacture and install additional advanced centrifuges at its Natanz facility in about 10 years, substantially boosting the country’s uranium-enrichment capability, according to a confidential document leaked last week by the Associated Press. According to the plan – which Iran reportedly shared with the IAEA six months ago – Tehran’s breakout time will shrink to a few weeks or less.

Furthermore, days after those revelations, Iranian officials said that they are prepared to swiftly reinstall dismantled centrifuges should their counterparts not fulfill their commitments under the deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA. The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, even said that his country could restore its pre-JCPOA enrichment capacity within 45 days.

 

 

U.S. Dept. of State

July 27, 2016

"JCPOA implementation will face ‘some turbulences’ in coming months, Heinonen claims"

Q&A

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

“Implementation has started well, but I see some turbulences during the months to come,” Heinonen tells the Tehran Times. Though both Russia and the U.S. have criticized UN chief Ban Ki-moon for his report of the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 2231, the former IAEA official defends the drafting of the report by saying “since the resolution calls Iran not to conduct tests with missiles designed for carrying nuclear weapons, the Secretary General apparently felt it necessary to express his views on the tests conducted by Iran during recent months.”

 

 

July 1, 2016

"Uranium Particles at Parchin Indicate Possible Undeclared Iranian Nuclear Activities"

Op-Ed, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

"On December 2, 2015, the IAEA issued its assessment on past and present outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear program and its Possible Military Dimensions (PMD). Buried in a footnote is a crucial detail: the presence of man-made uranium particles at the Parchin military complex. Last week, The Wall Street Journal’s Jay Solomon reported U.S. officials saying those particles likely relate to previous nuclear weapons activities, thereby raising even more questions. For example, where is the nuclear material used for those nuclear weapons activities, and what is the source of the particles found at Parchin? The question of whether Iran still has undeclared nuclear material is therefore critical..."

 

 

Kaeri Photo

March 29, 2013

Safeguards for Pyroprocessing Plants

Media Feature

By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

Senior Fellow Olli Heinonen discussed pyroprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, its proliferation risks, and safeguards.

 

 

AP Photo

September 16, 2011

"Preventing the Next Fukushima"

Magazine or Newspaper Article, Science, volume 333

By Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

"If nuclear power is to grow on the scale required to be a significant part of the solution to global climate disruption or scarcity of fossil fuels, major steps are needed to rebuild confidence that nuclear facilities will be safe from accidents and secure against attacks."

 

 

AP Photo

May 26, 2011

"Preventing the Next Fukushima"

Op-Ed

By Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project

This week, when the leaders of the G8 industrial democracies gather in France, their meeting will include discussions of what steps must be taken to strengthen global nuclear safety and global nuclear security  in the aftermath of the tragedy at Fukushima. The Belfer Center's Matthew Bunn and Olli Heinonen suggest new actions the world community should take in five key areas in order to prevent another Fukushima.

 

 

April 13, 2011

Nuclear Security Summit: One Year On and Looking Ahead

Op-Ed

By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project and Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

We asked nuclear policy experts in Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs to summarize in one paragraph the achievements in the year since President Obama convened a summit on nuclear security on April 12-13, 2010. And we asked for a second paragraph on what needs to be done in the year before the follow-up summit planned for Seoul, South Korea.

 
Events Calendar

We host a busy schedule of events throughout the fall, winter and spring. Past guests include: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, former Vice President Al Gore, and former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev.