David Nusbaum
Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
Contact:
Telephone: 617-495-7584
Fax: 617-496-0606
Email: david_nusbaum@hks.harvard.edu
April 3, 2013
"Accelerate the Accelerators! Are There Alternatives to Nuclear Research Reactors?"
Presentation
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
This seminar reviewed the alternatives to nuclear research reactors and the benefits of adopting the technology of accelerators in order to reduce dependence on enriched uranium.
DOE Photo
April 12, 2012
"Is Suspension the Solution?"
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
When the United States and North Korea reached agreement on nuclear matters in February, the suspension of uranium enrichment was rightly hailed as one of the arrangement's great successes, but there are no international regulations that define what suspension of nuclear activities entails or how it should be monitored and enforced. The international community needs to be aware of diversion risks during suspension of enrichment and should require the dismantlement and sealing of equipment in sensitive areas as part of suspension agreements.
October 4, 2011
"Nuclear 101: Uranium Enrichment and Plutonium Production"
Presentation
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
Project on Managing the Atom's Nuclear 101 series presents overviews of key issues affecting the future of nuclear weapons, energy, and nonproliferation policies.
DOE Photo
April 12, 2012
"Is Suspension the Solution?"
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
When the United States and North Korea reached agreement on nuclear matters in February, the suspension of uranium enrichment was rightly hailed as one of the arrangement's great successes, but there are no international regulations that define what suspension of nuclear activities entails or how it should be monitored and enforced. The international community needs to be aware of diversion risks during suspension of enrichment and should require the dismantlement and sealing of equipment in sensitive areas as part of suspension agreements.
October 4, 2011
"Nuclear 101: Uranium Enrichment and Plutonium Production"
Presentation
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
Project on Managing the Atom's Nuclear 101 series presents overviews of key issues affecting the future of nuclear weapons, energy, and nonproliferation policies.
DOE Photo
April 12, 2012
"Is Suspension the Solution?"
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
When the United States and North Korea reached agreement on nuclear matters in February, the suspension of uranium enrichment was rightly hailed as one of the arrangement's great successes, but there are no international regulations that define what suspension of nuclear activities entails or how it should be monitored and enforced. The international community needs to be aware of diversion risks during suspension of enrichment and should require the dismantlement and sealing of equipment in sensitive areas as part of suspension agreements.
October 4, 2011
"Nuclear 101: Uranium Enrichment and Plutonium Production"
Presentation
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
Project on Managing the Atom's Nuclear 101 series presents overviews of key issues affecting the future of nuclear weapons, energy, and nonproliferation policies.
DOE Photo
April 12, 2012
"Is Suspension the Solution?"
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
When the United States and North Korea reached agreement on nuclear matters in February, the suspension of uranium enrichment was rightly hailed as one of the arrangement's great successes, but there are no international regulations that define what suspension of nuclear activities entails or how it should be monitored and enforced. The international community needs to be aware of diversion risks during suspension of enrichment and should require the dismantlement and sealing of equipment in sensitive areas as part of suspension agreements.
DOE Photo
April 12, 2012
"Is Suspension the Solution?"
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
When the United States and North Korea reached agreement on nuclear matters in February, the suspension of uranium enrichment was rightly hailed as one of the arrangement's great successes, but there are no international regulations that define what suspension of nuclear activities entails or how it should be monitored and enforced. The international community needs to be aware of diversion risks during suspension of enrichment and should require the dismantlement and sealing of equipment in sensitive areas as part of suspension agreements.
DOE Photo
April 12, 2012
"Is Suspension the Solution?"
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
When the United States and North Korea reached agreement on nuclear matters in February, the suspension of uranium enrichment was rightly hailed as one of the arrangement's great successes, but there are no international regulations that define what suspension of nuclear activities entails or how it should be monitored and enforced. The international community needs to be aware of diversion risks during suspension of enrichment and should require the dismantlement and sealing of equipment in sensitive areas as part of suspension agreements.
