David Nusbaum
Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
Contact:
Telephone: 617-495-7584
Fax: 617-496-0606
Email: david_nusbaum@hks.harvard.edu
Reuters
Forthcoming July 14, 2013
"Suspension of Nuclear Activities Is Not End of Diversion Risks"
Conference Paper
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
A long-standing goal of diplomacy with Iran is persuading Iran to suspend its enrichment operations while it clarifies its past activities and while negotiations proceed on a more permanent resolution to the nuclear crisis. However, there is problem in using suspension of nuclear material production as a negotiating step: The technical details of suspension have never been clearly defined. The international community needs to be aware of the diversion risks during a suspension of enrichment activities and should mitigate these risks by including the necessary verification measures during negotiations and signing of any agreement on suspension.
April 3, 2013
"Accelerate the Accelerators! Are There Alternatives to Nuclear Research Reactors?"
Presentation
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
This seminar reviewed the alternatives to nuclear research reactors and the benefits of adopting the technology of accelerators in order to reduce dependence on enriched uranium.
DOE Photo
April 12, 2012
"Is Suspension the Solution?"
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
When the United States and North Korea reached agreement on nuclear matters in February, the suspension of uranium enrichment was rightly hailed as one of the arrangement's great successes, but there are no international regulations that define what suspension of nuclear activities entails or how it should be monitored and enforced. The international community needs to be aware of diversion risks during suspension of enrichment and should require the dismantlement and sealing of equipment in sensitive areas as part of suspension agreements.
October 4, 2011
"Nuclear 101: Uranium Enrichment and Plutonium Production"
Presentation
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
Project on Managing the Atom's Nuclear 101 series presents overviews of key issues affecting the future of nuclear weapons, energy, and nonproliferation policies.
Reuters
Forthcoming July 14, 2013
"Suspension of Nuclear Activities Is Not End of Diversion Risks"
Conference Paper
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
A long-standing goal of diplomacy with Iran is persuading Iran to suspend its enrichment operations while it clarifies its past activities and while negotiations proceed on a more permanent resolution to the nuclear crisis. However, there is problem in using suspension of nuclear material production as a negotiating step: The technical details of suspension have never been clearly defined. The international community needs to be aware of the diversion risks during a suspension of enrichment activities and should mitigate these risks by including the necessary verification measures during negotiations and signing of any agreement on suspension.
April 3, 2013
"Accelerate the Accelerators! Are There Alternatives to Nuclear Research Reactors?"
Presentation
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
This seminar reviewed the alternatives to nuclear research reactors and the benefits of adopting the technology of accelerators in order to reduce dependence on enriched uranium.
DOE Photo
April 12, 2012
"Is Suspension the Solution?"
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
When the United States and North Korea reached agreement on nuclear matters in February, the suspension of uranium enrichment was rightly hailed as one of the arrangement's great successes, but there are no international regulations that define what suspension of nuclear activities entails or how it should be monitored and enforced. The international community needs to be aware of diversion risks during suspension of enrichment and should require the dismantlement and sealing of equipment in sensitive areas as part of suspension agreements.
October 4, 2011
"Nuclear 101: Uranium Enrichment and Plutonium Production"
Presentation
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
Project on Managing the Atom's Nuclear 101 series presents overviews of key issues affecting the future of nuclear weapons, energy, and nonproliferation policies.
Reuters
Forthcoming July 14, 2013
"Suspension of Nuclear Activities Is Not End of Diversion Risks"
Conference Paper
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
A long-standing goal of diplomacy with Iran is persuading Iran to suspend its enrichment operations while it clarifies its past activities and while negotiations proceed on a more permanent resolution to the nuclear crisis. However, there is problem in using suspension of nuclear material production as a negotiating step: The technical details of suspension have never been clearly defined. The international community needs to be aware of the diversion risks during a suspension of enrichment activities and should mitigate these risks by including the necessary verification measures during negotiations and signing of any agreement on suspension.
April 3, 2013
"Accelerate the Accelerators! Are There Alternatives to Nuclear Research Reactors?"
Presentation
By David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
This seminar reviewed the alternatives to nuclear research reactors and the benefits of adopting the technology of accelerators in order to reduce dependence on enriched uranium.
