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Postdoctoral Research Fellow, International Security Program/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program/Project on Technology, Security, and Conflict in the Cyber Age
Lucas Kello is a joint postdoctoral research fellow in the International Security Program and the Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program. He is exploring the implications of cyber weapons for international relations and security. One aspect of his work involves the design of a conceptual framework for the analysis of deterrence and escalation dynamics in the cyber domain, while his policy research focuses on European and NATO institutional responses to emergent cyber threats.
Kello has served as a consultant to European Union (EU) authorities and the Estonian Government on cyber defense strategy. He has also worked with the Spanish Ministry of Defense in various areas of security policy, including post-conflict stabilization in the Middle East.
Kello holds a bachelor's degree from Harvard College as well as a masters and doctorate in International Relations from Oxford University, where he received the Magdalen College Apgar Award. His doctoral work examined the origins of postwar European unity, specifically the interval of 1947–1957. At Oxford he taught courses in international relations theory, international security studies, the Cold War, the two World Wars, and EU politics. Presently, he designs and teaches, with Harvard faculty, postgraduate courses at the Harvard Kennedy School on international cyber security.
May 3, 2012
By Lucas Kello, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, International Security Program/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program/Project on Technology, Security, and Conflict in the Cyber Age
The risks posed by the proliferation of cyber weapons are gaining wide recognition among security planners. Yet the general reaction of scholars of international relations has been to neglect the cyber peril owing to its technical novelties and intricacies. This attitude amounts to either one or both of two claims: the problem is not of sufficient scale to warrant close inspection, or it is not comprehensible to a non-technical observer. This seminar challenged both assertions.