Fall 2012
"Correspondence: Debating India’s Pathway to Nuclearization"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 37
By Andrew B. Kennedy, Jason Stone, Gaurav Kampani and Karthika Sasikumar, Former Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2010–2011; Former Associate, International Security Program, 2008–2009
Gaurav Kampani, Karthika Sasikumar, and Jason Stone each respond to Andrew B. Kennedy's fall 2011 International Security article, "India's Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb."
AP Photo
Fall 2011
"India's Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 36
After decades of flirting with nuclear weapons, India finally emerged as a nuclear power in the 1990s. New evidence suggests that India was able to hold off in part because it was able to secure protection through an alternate method: implicit “umbrellas” from superpowers. In the late 1970s, however, U.S. support for India waned as it began to improve its relations with Pakistan, and India lost its other major backer with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. By the late 1980s, India could no longer protect itself through diplomatic means, and acquisition of the bomb became an inevitable response to its security needs.
