Matthew Bunn

November 20, 2007

"Proliferation-Resistance (and Terror-Resistance) of Nuclear Energy Systems"

Presentation

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Matthew Bunn presented "proliferation-Resistance (and Terror-Resistance) of Nuclear Energy Systems at MIT for the "Systems Analysis of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" course.

Dr. Mohammad Saeidi

November 15, 2007

"Constraining Iran's Nuclear Program: Assessing Options and Risks"

Presentation

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Matthew Bunn presented "Constraining Iran's Nuclear Program: Assessing Options and Risks" to staff members at Oak Ridge National Laboratory on November 15, 2007. He argues, it is time to begin thinking seriously about what the least dangerous options involving some centrifuges in Iran might be, and explores the risks and advantages of an option involving 1-4 cascades with international ownership and a 24/7 international staff for all centrifuge activities.

November 14, 2007

"Risks of GNEP’s Focus on Near-Term Reprocessing"

Testimony

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Matthew Bunn's testimony for the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Full Committee Hearing on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).

Some elements of GNEP could make important contributions to reducing proliferation risks. Unfortunately, GNEP's heavy focus on building a commercial-scale reprocessing plant in the near term would, if accepted, increase proliferation risks rather than decreasing them.

November 13, 2007

"Pakistan's Political Unrest Prompts Questions About Nuclear Arsenal"

Media Interview Transcripts

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Matthew Bunn was a guest on the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer discussing Pakistan's nuclear security.

Bunn said, in part: "I think there is a real, immediate danger, not because Pakistan's nuclear stockpiles are not well-guarded -- I think they are -- but there are huge threats in Pakistan. It is, after all, al-Qaida's world headquarters, and there are nuclear and military insiders with Islamic extremist sympathies and, in some cases, with a demonstrated record of selling sensitive nuclear technologies around the world, in the case of the A.Q. Khan black market nuclear network. So while there's a very focused nuclear security system in place, that system has to deal with very big threats."

October 2007

"Disposition of Excess Highly Enriched Uranium"

Book Chapter

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Anatoli Diakov

This chapter describes the progress of the Russian and U.S. HEU disposition programs and how they could be expanded and accelerated. It also provides a brief update on the progress of the international programs to clean out and dispose of civilian HEU. The quantities of HEU involved are much smaller than those in the weapons programs but civilian sites are typically much less secure than military ones. Cleaning them out may therefore contribute more to reducing the overall danger of nuclear theft.

October 2007

"Disposition of Excess Plutonium"

Book Chapter

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Anatoli Diakov

This chapter describes disposition options and assesses the Russian and U.S. programs. The discussion is also relevant to the problem of disposing of the world's growing stocks of separated civil plutonium —especially in the United Kingdom, which currently has no disposition plan.

September/October 2007

"Bombs We Can Stop"

Journal Article, American Scientist, issue 5, volume 95

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

"William Langewiesche has the reputation of being one of America's best investigative reporters. Unfortunately, he has written a very bad book on nuclear proliferation." Matthew Bunn reviews The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, by William Langewiesche.

September 26, 2007

Securing the Bomb 2007

Book

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Managing the Atom Senior Research Associate Matthew Bunn provides a comprehensive assessment of efforts to secure and remove vulnerable nuclear stockpiles around the world, and a detailed action plan for reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. Securing the Bomb 2007 was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). The full report, with additional information on the threat of nuclear terrorism, is available on the NTI website.

http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/

September 26, 2007

"Thwarting Terrorists: More to Be Done"

Op-Ed, Washington Post

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

"...much progress has been made toward upgrading security for nuclear stockpiles. The bad news is that the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons exist in hundreds of buildings in more than 40 countries, and terrorists are actively trying to get a nuclear bomb or the materials to make one."

July 2007

"Reducing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threats"

Conference Paper

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Tom Bielefeld, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Urgent actions are needed to prevent a nuclear or radiological 9/11.  Terrorists are actively seeking nuclear weapons and Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) and the materials to make them.  There are scores of sites where the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons exist, in dozens of countries worldwide.  There are thousands of sites worldwide where radiological materials exist.  Many of these sites are not sufficiently secured to defeat the kinds of threats that terrorists and criminals have demonstrated they can pose.  A dangerous gap remains between the urgency of the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism and the scope and pace of the U.S. and world response.  While the gap has narrowed significantly in recent years, much more needs to be done.  This paper describes the nuclear and radiological terrorism threats, analyzes the actions taken so far to address these threats, and recommends further actions going forward.