Matthew Bunn

May 20, 2002

Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action

Report

By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007, John P. Holdren, Former Director and Faculty Chair, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Spring 2002

"Strengthening Nuclear Security Against Post-September 11 Threats of Theft and Sabotage"

Journal Article, Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, issue 3, volume 30

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and George Bunn

The appalling events of September 11, 2001, require a major international initiative to strengthen security for nuclear materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities are secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case.

December 10, 2001

Securing Plutonium and HEU - What Should We Be Doing After September 11th?

Conference Proceedings

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

October 29-November 2, 2001

"Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage"

Conference Paper

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and George Bunn

The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches.  But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.

October 29, 2001

Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage

Conference Proceedings

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

October 29, 2001

Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage

Journal Article, Proceedings of the Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Symposium held in Vienna, Austria, October 29-November 2, 2001, volume IAEA-SM-367/4/08

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches.  But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.

October 29, 2001

Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage

Journal Article, Proceedings of the Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Presented at symposium in Vienna, Austria, October 29-November 2, 2001, volume IAEA-SM-367/4/08

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches.  But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.

15-19 July 2001

Russian Import of Foreign Spent Fuel: Status and Policy Implications

Book Chapter

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Russia has recently approved legislation allowing it to offer to import foreign spent fuel for storage, reprocessing, or even disposal in Russia. This represents a potentially dramatic development in the decades-long history of efforts to establish internationally collaborative approaches to management of spent fuel and nuclear wastes.

July 15, 2001

Renewing the Partnership: One Year Later

Conference Proceedings

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

In August 2000, the authors published a comprehensive report assessing the U.S.-Russian Material Protection, Control and Accounting program and making recommendations for accelerating and strengthening the effort. The report emphasized the security importance of the MPC&A program and critically examined the program’s status and policies in several major areas: budgets, schedules, and plans; technical and policy approaches; program management and partnership with Russia; and access. In this paper, the authors update and review their previous assessment in light of the MPC&A progress and challenges of the past year, and make recommendations intended to strengthen and accelerate the effort and increase the chances that MPC&A improvements will be sustained over time.

July 15, 2001

Renewing the Partnership: One Year Later

Journal Article, Proceedings the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Meeting held in Indian Wells, California, July 15-19, 2001

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

In August 2000, the authors published a comprehensive report assessing the U.S.-Russian Material Protection, Control and Accounting program and making recommendations for accelerating and strengthening the effort. The report emphasized the security importance of the MPC&A program and critically examined the program’s status and policies in several major areas: budgets, schedules, and plans; technical and policy approaches; program management and partnership with Russia; and access. In this paper, the authors update and review their previous assessment in light of the MPC&A progress and challenges of the past year, and make recommendations intended to strengthen and accelerate the effort and increase the chances that MPC&A improvements will be sustained over time.