Matthew Bunn

September 24, 2002

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

Testimony

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Testimony given by Matthew Bunn for the Subcommitte on National Security, Committee of Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives. Hearing on Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, September 24, 2002.

September 3, 2002

"Keeping Nukes Out of Terrorist Hands"

Op-Ed, Boston Globe

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007

"...There is no one person anywhere in the government with the full-time job of leading and coordinating efforts to keep nuclear weapons — or other weapons of mass destruction — out of terrorist hands. With no single leader, there is also no integrated plan or overarching strategy that would allow these programs to work together efficiently, close the gaps in our nation's response, and eliminate overlap and duplication. We have a great fleet, but no admiral steering its course...."

August 29, 2002

A Nuclear Weapon Just Waiting to Happen: Perilous Materials at Insecure Sites Around the World Must be Removed

Op-Ed, Los Angeles Times

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

August 2002

U.S. Program for Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium

Book Chapter

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

May 20, 2002

Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action

Report

By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007, John P. Holdren, Former Director and Faculty Chair, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Spring 2002

"Strengthening Nuclear Security Against Post-September 11 Threats of Theft and Sabotage"

Journal Article, Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, issue 3, volume 30

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and George Bunn

The appalling events of September 11, 2001, require a major international initiative to strengthen security for nuclear materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities are secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case.

December 10, 2001

Securing Plutonium and HEU - What Should We Be Doing After September 11th?

Conference Proceedings

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

October 29-November 2, 2001

"Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage"

Conference Paper

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and George Bunn

The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches.  But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.

October 29, 2001

Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage

Journal Article, Proceedings of the Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Symposium held in Vienna, Austria, October 29-November 2, 2001, volume IAEA-SM-367/4/08

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches.  But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.

October 29, 2001

Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage

Journal Article, Proceedings of the Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Presented at symposium in Vienna, Austria, October 29-November 2, 2001, volume IAEA-SM-367/4/08

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches.  But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.