Matthew Bunn
Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Member of the Board
Contact:
Telephone: (617) 495-9916
Fax: 617-495-8963
Email: matthew_bunn@harvard.edu
DOD
May 8, 2009
"Securing all Nuclear Stockpiles in Four Years – What’s Required?"
Presentation
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Bunn presented "Securing all Nuclear Stockpiles in Four Years – What’s Required?" at the Partnership for Global Security's "Right-Sizing the Budget for Global Nuclear Security" workshop on May 8, 2009.
AP
February 18, 2009
Tackling U.S. Energy Challenges and Opportunities: Preliminary Policy Recommendations for Enhancing Energy Innovation in The United States
Report
By Laura Diaz Anadon, Associate Director, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program; Director, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group; Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Kelly Sims Gallagher, Senior Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group, Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Charles Jones, Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group
ETIP’s Energy Research, Development, Demonstration & Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project has developed recommendations for energy innovation in the United States. These recommendations lay out a comprehensive strategy for investment in energy innovation, new approaches to managing the effort, and policies for moving new technology into the marketplace.
GAO, 2001
December 10, 2008
"Securing the Bomb 2008 Next Steps to Keep Nuclear Weapons and Materials Out of Terrorist Hands Congressional Briefing"
Presentation
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Bunn presented "Securing the Bomb 2008: Next Steps to Keep Nuclear Weapons and Materials Out of Terrorist Hands" at a Congressional briefing organized by the Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy, American Association for the Advancement of Science.
November 2008
"Preventing Nuclear Terrorism"
Book Chapter
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Andrew Newman, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, August 2008–February 2011
Matthew Bunn and Andrew Newman contributed the chapter "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism," to the 2009 National Security and Nonproliferation Briefing Book, published by the Peace and Security Initiative.
AFP/Getty Images
September/October 2008
"A Nuclear Revival Needs New Cooperation"
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, issue 4, volume 64
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
In an Op-Ed in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin argue that a reinvigorated IAEA and new approaches to cooperation on nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation are required for nuclear energy to make a significant contribution to mitigating climate change without creating undue risks.
AP Photo
June 13, 2008
Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order: The Role of the IAEA
Memorandum
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
The high-level Commission of Eminent Persons advising the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that meeting the current nuclear challenges and seizing the current opportunities will require a fundamentally reinvigorated global nuclear order, featuring a strengthened IAEA with "additional authority, resources, personnel, and technology." Without a "bold agenda" of steps to strengthen the nuclear order, the Commission warned that there were real risks that terrorists might get a nuclear bomb, that a nuclear accident might occur, or that, as the UN High-Level Panel warned, the world could suffer "a cascade of nuclear proliferation." Preventing such events, the Commission emphasized, is essential for nuclear energy to grow enough to contribute to mitigating climate change, making safety, security, and nonproliferation essential foundations for nuclear energy's future.
June 3, 2008
DOE FY09 Budget Request for Energy Research, Development & Demonstration – Commentary
Report
By Laura Diaz Anadon, Associate Director, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program; Director, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group; Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Kelly Sims Gallagher, Senior Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Anadon, Gallagher, and Bunn offer their insight and analysis on the President's FY09 budget request for U.S. Department of Energy spending for energy research, development, and demonstration.
Winter 2006
"Cooperation to Secure Nuclear Stockpiles: A Case of Constrained Innovation"
Journal Article, Innovations, issue 1, volume 1
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
The 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union posed an unprecedented challenge: to keep tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium to make tens of thousands more, out of hostile hands. In this crisis, small groups of policy entrepreneurs launched major innovations to spur the nuclear complexes of the former rival superpowers to pursue their common interest in securing and dismantling nuclear stockpiles. Billions of dollars have now been spent pursuing these efforts, thousands of bombs' worth of nuclear materials have been permanently destroyed, and security both for thousands of nuclear weapons and for enough nuclear material for tens of thousands more has been substantially improved.
October 29-November 2, 2001
"Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage"
Conference Paper
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and George Bunn
The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches. But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.
September 2010
The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Energy
Report
By Frank N. von Hippel, Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Anatoli Diakov, Ming Ding, Tadahiro Katsuta, Charles McCombie, M.V. Ramana, Tatsujiro Suzuki, Susan Voss and Suyuan Yu
In the 1970s, nuclear-power boosters expected that by now nuclear power would produce perhaps 80 to 90 percent of all electrical energy globally. Today, the official high-growth projection of the Organization for Economic Co‑operation and Developments (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) estimates that nuclear power plants will generate about 20 percent of all electrical energy in 2050. Thus, nuclear power could make a significant contribution to the global electricity supply. Or it could be phased out — especially if there is another accidental or a terrorist-caused Chernobyl-scale release of radioactivity. If the spread of nuclear energy cannot be decoupled from the spread of nuclear weapons, it should be phased out.
