Matthew Bunn

Dr. Mohammad Saeidi

November 15, 2007

"Constraining Iran's Nuclear Program: Assessing Options and Risks"

Presentation

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Matthew Bunn presented "Constraining Iran's Nuclear Program: Assessing Options and Risks" to staff members at Oak Ridge National Laboratory on November 15, 2007. He argues, it is time to begin thinking seriously about what the least dangerous options involving some centrifuges in Iran might be, and explores the risks and advantages of an option involving 1-4 cascades with international ownership and a 24/7 international staff for all centrifuge activities.

November 14, 2007

"Risks of GNEP’s Focus on Near-Term Reprocessing"

Testimony

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Matthew Bunn's testimony for the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Full Committee Hearing on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).

Some elements of GNEP could make important contributions to reducing proliferation risks. Unfortunately, GNEP's heavy focus on building a commercial-scale reprocessing plant in the near term would, if accepted, increase proliferation risks rather than decreasing them.

November 13, 2007

"Pakistan's Political Unrest Prompts Questions About Nuclear Arsenal"

Media Interview Transcripts

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Matthew Bunn was a guest on the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer discussing Pakistan's nuclear security.

Bunn said, in part: "I think there is a real, immediate danger, not because Pakistan's nuclear stockpiles are not well-guarded -- I think they are -- but there are huge threats in Pakistan. It is, after all, al-Qaida's world headquarters, and there are nuclear and military insiders with Islamic extremist sympathies and, in some cases, with a demonstrated record of selling sensitive nuclear technologies around the world, in the case of the A.Q. Khan black market nuclear network. So while there's a very focused nuclear security system in place, that system has to deal with very big threats."

September/October 2007

"Bombs We Can Stop"

Journal Article, American Scientist, issue 5, volume 95

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

"William Langewiesche has the reputation of being one of America's best investigative reporters. Unfortunately, he has written a very bad book on nuclear proliferation." Matthew Bunn reviews The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, by William Langewiesche.

September 26, 2007

Securing the Bomb 2007

Book

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Managing the Atom Senior Research Associate Matthew Bunn provides a comprehensive assessment of efforts to secure and remove vulnerable nuclear stockpiles around the world, and a detailed action plan for reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. Securing the Bomb 2007 was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). The full report, with additional information on the threat of nuclear terrorism, is available on the NTI website.

DOE

May 30-31, 2007

"Setting Priorities: Assessing the Global Risk of Nuclear Theft"

Presentation

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Matthew Bunn presented "Setting Priorities: Assessing the Global Risk of Nuclear Theft" at a Workshop on Nuclear Security Risk Management, Institute for Nuclear Materials Management.

April 2007

"Troubled Disposition: Next Steps in Dealing With Excess Plutonium"

Magazine or Newspaper Article, Arms Control Today, issue 3, volume 37

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Matthew Bunn argues that plutonium disposition—physically transforming it into a form that would be difficult and costly to recover for use in nuclear weapons—if carried out on a large scale would “mark a key step toward deeper and less-reversible nuclear arms reductions.”  But, as he documents, delays, costs, and obstacles have plagued plutonium disposition plans in both the United States and Russia.

April 2007

"The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism"

Book Chapter

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007

This chapter is based on "The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism" which appeared in the April 2005 issue of Current History.

February 2007

"Funding for U.S. Efforts to Improve Controls Over Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise Overseas: Recent Developments and Trends"

Paper

By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007 and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier find that although threat reduction funding has had dramatic effects in reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism, the Bush administration’s proposed FY 2008 budget for cooperative threat reduction would reduce the overall funds available.  They propose a number of remedies, some of which have been taken up by congress in the appropriations process.

November 19, 2006

"Bombs That Won't Go Off"

Op-Ed, Washington Post

By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007 and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

"...One piece of good news has been unfolding: While there's a great deal more to do, much of the world's potential nuclear bomb material, scattered in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries around the world, is notably more secure than it was before Sept. 11, 2001, which means that it's harder for terrorists to steal. And the critical effort to remove such material entirely from the world's most vulnerable sites is picking up steam."