Matthew Bunn
Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Member of the Board
Contact:
Telephone: (617) 495-9916
Fax: 617-495-8963
Email: matthew_bunn@harvard.edu
1997
Defending the United States Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Memorandum
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School, Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities, John M. Deutch, International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Richard A. Falkenrath, Former Assistant Professor of Public Policy; Former Principal Investigator, Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness; Former Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John P. Holdren, Former Director and Faculty Chair, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program, Robert Newman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1995-1996 and Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
Unpublished memorandum to the United States Senate
Jun 10, 2013
"On Iran's Nuclear Program, Obama Should Take a Cue From JFK and 'Go First'"
Op-Ed, Christian Science Monitor
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
"Fifty years ago, President John F. Kennedy delivered a commencement address at American University whose message echoes down the decades to the challenges America faces today – including the challenge of Iran."
Jun 10, 2013
"Bold Initiatives to Reduce Tensions – 50 Years Ago and Today"
Op-Ed, Power & Policy Blog
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
"The fundamental idea that conciliatory actions can help overcome mistrust and misperceptions is as applicable today as it was a half century ago. And certainly the U.S.-Iranian standoff is one of many challenges desperately in need of an approach for beginning to roll back the distorted perceptions that make it so difficult to find whether any genuine common ground exists."
Mark Wilson/Getty
May 21, 2012
"How To Avoid a War with Iran"
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Abbas Maleki, Associate, International Security Program
Observers would be forgiven for dismissing negotiations over Iran's nuclear program as Kabuki theater. Despite years of on-again, off-again efforts, after all, fears of war continue to simmer. Such frustrations are understandable -- but they may not be entirely justified.
June 6, 2011
The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment of Nuclear Terrorism
Report
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Yuri Morozov, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Simon Saradzhyan, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Viktor I. Yesin and Pavel S. Zolotarev
Researchers from the United States and Russia have issued a joint assessment of the global threat of nuclear terrorism, warning of a persistent danger that terrorists could obtain or make a nuclear device and use it with catastrophic consequences. The first joint threat assessment by experts from the world’s two major nuclear powers concludes: “If current approaches toward eliminating the threat are not replaced with a sense of urgency and resolve, the question will become not if but when, and on what scale, the first act of nuclear terrorism occurs.”
AP Photo
November 2009
"Beyond Zero Enrichment: Suggestions for an Iranian Nuclear Deal"
Policy Brief
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
"Some form of negotiated agreement, if it can be achieved, is the “least bad” option for U.S. interests—but is likely to have to include some continuing enrichment in Iran. There are real security risks in agreeing to permit some ongoing enrichment in Iran, but if appropriately managed, these security risks are less than those created by a military strike or allowing Iran to continue unfettered enrichment with no agreement."
February 2007
"Funding for U.S. Efforts to Improve Controls Over Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise Overseas: Recent Developments and Trends"
Paper
By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007 and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier find that although threat reduction funding has had dramatic effects in reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism, the Bush administration’s proposed FY 2008 budget for cooperative threat reduction would reduce the overall funds available. They propose a number of remedies, some of which have been taken up by congress in the appropriations process.
June 15, 2006
"Finding Compromise in Iran"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Abbas Maleki, Associate, International Security Program and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
"...If Iran is willing to agree to a deal under which it would remain legally committed not to build nuclear weapons, no more centrifuges would be added, and extensive verification would be allowed, that would be far better for US security than letting insistence on zero propel a drift toward confrontation. After all, failure to reach agreement would mean no limit on Iran's centrifuges, and a drift in the direction of sanctions and potential military strikes, with all the dangers they would hold...."
March 23, 2006
"Finding a Way Out of the Iranian Nuclear Crisis"
Paper
By Abbas Maleki, Associate, International Security Program and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
"...Rather than rushing toward confrontation with all its risks, all sides must put historic antipathies aside and find face-saving solutions. To give the Iranian advocates of compromise a chance to succeed, the United States and the other major powers need to put offers on the table that will show the people of Iran that nuclear restraint and compliance will put their nation on a path toward peace and prosperity."
Winter 2006
"Cooperation to Secure Nuclear Stockpiles: A Case of Constrained Innovation"
Journal Article, Innovations, issue 1, volume 1
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
The 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union posed an unprecedented challenge: to keep tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium to make tens of thousands more, out of hostile hands. In this crisis, small groups of policy entrepreneurs launched major innovations to spur the nuclear complexes of the former rival superpowers to pursue their common interest in securing and dismantling nuclear stockpiles. Billions of dollars have now been spent pursuing these efforts, thousands of bombs' worth of nuclear materials have been permanently destroyed, and security both for thousands of nuclear weapons and for enough nuclear material for tens of thousands more has been substantially improved.
