Matthew Bunn

May 31, 1998

Security for Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials: Expanding International Cooperation, Strengthening International Standards

Book Chapter

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

July 17, 2008

Expanded and Accelerated HEU Downblending: Designing Options to Serve the Interests of All Parties

Conference Paper

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Accelerating and expanding the downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) beyond the current 500-ton U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement would have significant security benefits.  Russia will still have large quantities of HEU not needed for military purposes after 500 tons of HEU has been blended to low-enriched uranium (LEU).  But no agreement to expand and accelerate the downblending of Russian or U.S. excess HEU will succeed unless it is structured in a way that serves the interests of all sides.  Russia has made clear that it has no interest in extending the HEU Purchase Agreement on its current terms.  This paper outlines key Russian, U.S., and industry interests relating to expanded and accelerated HEU downblending.

July 2007

"Reducing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threats"

Conference Paper

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Tom Bielefeld, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Urgent actions are needed to prevent a nuclear or radiological 9/11.  Terrorists are actively seeking nuclear weapons and Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) and the materials to make them.  There are scores of sites where the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons exist, in dozens of countries worldwide.  There are thousands of sites worldwide where radiological materials exist.  Many of these sites are not sufficiently secured to defeat the kinds of threats that terrorists and criminals have demonstrated they can pose.  A dangerous gap remains between the urgency of the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism and the scope and pace of the U.S. and world response.  While the gap has narrowed significantly in recent years, much more needs to be done.  This paper describes the nuclear and radiological terrorism threats, analyzes the actions taken so far to address these threats, and recommends further actions going forward.

July 16, 2006

Assessing the Benefits, Costs, and Risks of Near-Term Reprocessing and Alternatives

Conference Paper

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

June 30, 2005

Incentives for Nuclear Security

Conference Paper

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Research Associate Matthew Bunn presented at the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting on the importance of incentives in promoting and improving nuclear security.

2005

Building a Genuine U.S.-Russian Partnership for Nuclear Security

Conference Paper

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

MTA Research Associate Matthew Bunn presented at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management on building a genuine partnership between the United States and Russia to improve nuclear security.

July 13, 2003

Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: an Update

Conference Paper

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007

October 29-November 2, 2001

"Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage"

Conference Paper

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and George Bunn

The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches.  But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.

December 10, 2001

Securing Plutonium and HEU - What Should We Be Doing After September 11th?

Conference Proceedings

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

October 29, 2001

Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage

Conference Proceedings

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom