Matthew Bunn

Winter 2006

"Cooperation to Secure Nuclear Stockpiles: A Case of Constrained Innovation"

Journal Article, Innovations, issue 1, volume 1

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

The 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union posed an unprecedented challenge: to keep tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium to make tens of thousands more, out of hostile hands. In this crisis, small groups of policy entrepreneurs launched major innovations to spur the nuclear complexes of the former rival superpowers to pursue their common interest in securing and dismantling nuclear stockpiles. Billions of dollars have now been spent pursuing these efforts, thousands of bombs' worth of nuclear materials have been permanently destroyed, and security both for thousands of nuclear weapons and for enough nuclear material for tens of thousands more has been substantially improved.

June 2005

"The Economics of Reprocessing Versus Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel"

Journal Article, Nuclear Technology, volume 150

By Bob van der Zwaan, Former Research Associate, Energy Technology Innovation research group/Project on Managing the Atom Project/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2001–2005, John P. Holdren, Former Director and Faculty Chair, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program, Steve Fetter, Former Associate, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

The Economics of Reprocessing Versus Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel

April 2005

"The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism"

Journal Article, Current History

By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007 and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

This article is reproduced with the permission of Current History

Winter 2005

Preventing a Nuclear 9/11

Journal Article, Issues in Science and Technology

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Spring 2002

"Strengthening Nuclear Security Against Post-September 11 Threats of Theft and Sabotage"

Journal Article, Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, issue 3, volume 30

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and George Bunn

The appalling events of September 11, 2001, require a major international initiative to strengthen security for nuclear materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities are secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case.

October 29, 2001

Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage

Journal Article, Proceedings of the Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Presented at symposium in Vienna, Austria, October 29-November 2, 2001, volume IAEA-SM-367/4/08

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches.  But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.

October 29, 2001

Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage

Journal Article, Proceedings of the Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Symposium held in Vienna, Austria, October 29-November 2, 2001, volume IAEA-SM-367/4/08

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches.  But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.

July 15, 2001

Renewing the Partnership: One Year Later

Journal Article, Proceedings the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Meeting held in Indian Wells, California, July 15-19, 2001

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

In August 2000, the authors published a comprehensive report assessing the U.S.-Russian Material Protection, Control and Accounting program and making recommendations for accelerating and strengthening the effort. The report emphasized the security importance of the MPC&A program and critically examined the program’s status and policies in several major areas: budgets, schedules, and plans; technical and policy approaches; program management and partnership with Russia; and access. In this paper, the authors update and review their previous assessment in light of the MPC&A progress and challenges of the past year, and make recommendations intended to strengthen and accelerate the effort and increase the chances that MPC&A improvements will be sustained over time.

November / December 2000

Saga of the Siberian Plutonium Production Reactors

Journal Article, F. A. S. Public Interest Report, issue 6, volume 53

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

September, 1998

Retooling Russia's Nuclear Cities

Journal Article, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, issue 5, volume 54

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom