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Matthew Bunn

Matthew Bunn

Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

Member of the Board

Contact:
Telephone: (617) 495-9916
Fax: 617-495-8963
Email: matthew_bunn@harvard.edu

 

 

By Publication Type

 

July 15, 2001

Renewing the Partnership: One Year Later

Conference Proceedings

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

In August 2000, the authors published a comprehensive report assessing the U.S.-Russian Material Protection, Control and Accounting program and making recommendations for accelerating and strengthening the effort. The report emphasized the security importance of the MPC&A program and critically examined the program’s status and policies in several major areas: budgets, schedules, and plans; technical and policy approaches; program management and partnership with Russia; and access. In this paper, the authors update and review their previous assessment in light of the MPC&A progress and challenges of the past year, and make recommendations intended to strengthen and accelerate the effort and increase the chances that MPC&A improvements will be sustained over time.

 

November, 1998

"Japanese-Russian Agreement to Establish a Nuclear Facility for MOX Fabrication and Spent Fuel Storage in the Russian Far East"

Discussion Paper

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

 

November 9, 2011

Background: Transforming U.S. Energy Innovation Report

Fact Sheet

By Laura Diaz Anadon, Associate Director, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program; Director, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group; Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Gabe Chan, Research Fellow, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group, Melissa Chan, Former Research Fellow, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration & Deployment Policy Project, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group, January 2009–December 2010, Charles Jones, Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group, Ruud Kempener, Former Research Fellow, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group, 2009–2011, Audrey Lee, Former Research Fellow, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group, 2009–2011, Nathaniel Logar, Associate, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program/Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group and Venkatesh "Venky" Narayanamurti, Benjamin Peirce Professor of Technology and Public Policy; Professor of Physics, Harvard; Director, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group

The report, Transforming U.S. Energy Innovation, released on Nov. 22, 2011, is the result of a three-year energy research, development, demonstration, and deployment (ERD3) project of the Energy Technology Innovation Policy (ETIP) research group at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The ERD3 project was funded by a grant from the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation to produce and promote a comprehensive set of recommendations to help the U.S. administration accelerate the development and deployment of low-carbon energy technologies.

 

 

October 6, 2004

Threat Reduction Funding in the Bush Administration: Claims and Counterclaims in the First Presidential Debate

Fact Sheet

By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007 and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

 

 

October 6, 2004

Clarifying Statements on Securing Nuclear Materials in the Presidential Debate

Fact Sheet

By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007 and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

 

NEAMS/DOE Photo

2012

"Expert Judgments about RD&D and the Future of Nuclear Energy"

Journal Article, Environmental Science and Technology, issue 12, volume 46

By Laura Diaz Anadon, Associate Director, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program; Director, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group; Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Valentina Bosetti, Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Michela Catenacci and Audrey Lee, Former Research Fellow, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group, 2009–2011

Probabilistic estimates of the cost and performance of future nuclear energy systems under different scenarios of government research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) spending were obtained from 30 U.S. and 30 European nuclear technology experts. The majority expected that such RD&D would have only a modest effect on cost, but would improve performance in other areas, such as safety, waste management, and uranium resource utilization. The U.S. and E.U. experts were in relative agreement regarding how government RD&D funds should be allocated, placing particular focus on very high temperature reactors, sodium-cooled fast reactors, fuels and materials, and fuel cycle technologies.

 

 

Chuck Kennedy, White House

Winter 2011

"All Stocks of Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials Worldwide Must be Protected Against Global Terrorist Threats"

Journal Article, Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, volume 39.2

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Evgeniy P. Maslin

The danger of nuclear terrorism is real enough to justify urgent action to reduce the risk. Some terrorist groups are actively seeking nuclear weapons and the materials to make them; it is plausible that a technically sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude nuclear bomb if it acquired enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium; important weaknesses in nuclear security still exist in many countries and thefts of HEU and plutonium have already occurred; nuclear smuggling is very difficult to interdict; and the consequences of a terrorist nuclear detonation would be immense and far-reaching. Nuclear thieves could strike in any country. In this article, we outline a baseline set of adversary capabilities that all stocks of nuclear weapons, plutonium, or HEU should be protected against, no matter what country they are in, including both insiders and outsiders and a range of potential tactics. Bunn and Maslin recommend that countries facing more substantial adversary threats put even more capable security systems in place. The article calls for international cooperation, including technical and financial assistance where needed, to ensure that at least this baseline level of protection is in place for all nuclear weapons, plutonium, and HEU worldwide.

 

 

AP Photo

Fall 2009

"Reducing the Greatest Risks of Nuclear Theft & Terrorism"

Journal Article, Daedalus, issue 4, volume 138

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

"Keeping nuclear weapons and the difficult-to-manufacture materials needed to make them out of terrorist hands is critical to U.S. and world security — and to the future of nuclear energy as well. In the aftermath of a terrorist nuclear attack, there would be no chance of convincing governments, utilities, and publics to build nuclear reactors on the scale required for nuclear energy to make any significant contribution to coping with climate change."

 

 

Fall 2009

"Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks"

Journal Article, Innovations, issue 4, volume 4

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom

Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin examine the conditions needed for nuclear energy to grow on a scale large enough for it to be a significant part of the world’s response to climate change. They consider the safety, security, nonproliferation, and waste management risks associated with such growth and recommend approaches to managing these risks. Bunn and Malin argue that although technological solutions may contribute to nuclear expansion in the coming decades, in the near term, creating the conditions for large-scale nuclear energy growth will require major international institutional innovation.

 

 

September/October 2007

"Bombs We Can Stop"

Journal Article, American Scientist, issue 5, volume 95

By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom

"William Langewiesche has the reputation of being one of America's best investigative reporters. Unfortunately, he has written a very bad book on nuclear proliferation." Matthew Bunn reviews The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, by William Langewiesche.

 

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The Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) conducts and disseminates policy-relevant research on nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, and nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

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